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Various countries have extended the levying of withholding taxes beyond the traditional 
withholding taxes on royalties, dividends and interest.  Withholding taxes are now often levied 
on services such as management services, professional services, technical services, financial 
services, insurance services, fees, commission, advisory services and digital services, 
amongst others. 
The purpose of this paper is to consider the impact of these withholding taxes on certain 
services, in particularly intra-group cross border services in the context of source and related 
transfer pricing principles.   
In order to achieve this the following is addressed: 
1. The current environment of globalisation and the effect it has on the operations of 
Multi-National Enterprises is first considered in order to provide the context for the 
paper. 
2. The circumstances leading up to the introduction of withholding taxes on services are 
analysed together with a review of the definition of services and the source of services 
as decided in case law, both in the traditional context and in the context of withholding 
taxes on services. 
3. The implication of treaties in respect of withholding taxes on technical and other 
services is briefly reviewed. 
4. In order to consider the impact of withholding taxes on services a review of transfer 
pricing developments and the application of current transfer pricing principles globally 
was undertaken in respect of intra-group cross border services.  The relevance or 
effectiveness of the current transfer pricing principles is also briefly been dealt with. 
5. Whilst not dealt with in detail, other related issues relevant to intra-group cross border 
services are also noted, such as the deductibility of intra-group cross border service 
costs as well as the ability of recipient entities to benefit from tax credits in respect of 
withholding taxes on services levied on their income, or claim deductions for such 
withholding taxes on services costs incurred should a tax credit not be available. 
6. Finally conclusions are drawn as to the overall impact of withholding taxes on 
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It is common knowledge that globalisation has impaired the ability of countries to 
maintain their sovereignty in many respects.  Thomas Friedman dealt with aspects of 
this issue in 1999 in his book, The Lexus and the Olive Tree1 in which he states that 
globalisation since 1989, beginning with the fall of the Berlin Wall, represents "the 
inexorable integration of markets, nation-states and technologies to a degree never 
witnessed before. It is happening in a way that is enabling individuals, corporations 
and nation-states to reach around the world farther, faster, deeper and cheaper than 
ever before."2 This is in effect the start of the so-called “free market”. 
Any country wishing to participate in the “free market” has to abide by certain rules, 
which Friedman refers to as the “Golden Straightjacket”.  The characteristics of the 
“Golden Straightjacket” are the decentralisation of government, the privatisation of 
industry, and the elimination of tariffs and other obstacles to foreign investment, 
adherence to internationally established standards in accounting and auditing, as well 
as the effective regulation of their financial market to protect the rights of 
shareholders, amongst others.3 
Globalisation therefore created a wonderful opportunity for all people to raise their 
standards of living and increase personal freedoms, including access to information 
and economic options.  
Interestingly though, tax was not included in this list, which, in my view correctly, gives 
recognition to the sovereignty of a country to determine its own tax rules dependent 
on its own particular needs and circumstances.  Reality is however somewhat 
different in that globalisation has resulted in the reduction or loss of sovereignty in the 
determination of tax policy of various countries.  Charles E. McLure, Jr. dealt with this 
aspect in some detail in an article published in August 2001, “Globlization, Tax Rules 
and National Sovereignty”4.  McLure states that “(T)his loss of sovereignty may take 
many forms, among them market-induced pressures to lower taxes and difficulty in 
applying existing tax rules.  By making it difficult to sustain revenue yields without 
placing increased tax burdens on consumption and labour, such developments may 
                                               
 
1 Friedman, Thomas L., The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization, Random House, 1999  
2 Lubeck, D., The Lexus and the Olive Tree, Issues in Global Education, Issue No. 157, 2000, 
http://www.globaled.org/issues/157/c.html, accessed on 16 February 2014 
3 Friedman, L., note 1, p. 105 
4 McLure, Charles E. Jr., Globalization, Tax Rules and National Sovereignty, Bulletin for International Fiscal 
Documentation, Volume 55, International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (“IBFD”), August 2001, pp. 328 – 341  
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lead to calls for limits on the activities of tax havens, new rules governing the taxation 
of internatio 
nal flows of income (generically a “GATT for taxes”) or even a new institution (a “World 
Tax Organization”) to enforce such rules, all of which, ironically, would also entail loss 
of national sovereignty.”5 
Currently, the world economies, through organisations such as the G8, G20 and the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”), have dealt with 
calls for limits on the activities of tax avoidance and are currently investigating new 
rules to govern the taxation of international flows of income following highly publicised 
cases involving alleged profit shifting and tax avoidance by prominent Multi-National 
Enterprises (“MNEs”). Various initiatives are underway to ensure tax compliance in 
developed and developing countries alike.  
The OECD issued a report on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (“BEPS”)6 which is 
regarded as the first step to review and analyse base erosion and profit shifting.  One 
of the areas identified as requiring investigation is related party transactions, and 
more specifically in the context of transfer pricing where it relates to shifting of risks 
and intangibles, the artificial splitting of ownership of assets between legal entities 
and related party transactions which would rarely take place between independent 
entities.7 The deadline for the reports dealing with actions 8 – 10 of the Action Plan 
on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting8 which will cover these areas is September 2015. 
In addition, initiatives to enable developing countries to develop processes and 
strategies which will enable them to collect the tax that is due to them are also in 
progress.  There is no “World Tax Organisation” as yet but various “Regional Tax 
Organisations” have been formed, for example the “African Tax Administration 
Forum” (“ATAF”). 
The “market” has evolved beyond the so-called “old thinking” in terms of which 
international activities could be compartmentalised.  The view in terms of the “old 
thinking” was that the political territory of a country represented a particular “market” 
where taxpayers performed certain activities, competed with other market participants 
using resources offered by that market and delivering goods and services to 
                                               
 
5 McLure, C., note 4., p. 328 
6 OECD (2013), Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD Publishing, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264192744-en, Date of issue: 12 February 2013 
7 Working Party No. 6 of the Committee on Fiscal Affairs of the OECD is dealing with the transfer pricing aspects 
of intangibles, including Multi-National Enterprise (“MNE”) activities such as intra-group cross border services. See 
annexure 1 for an overview of the issues being considered by the OECD and Working Party No. 6. 
8 OECD (2013), Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD Publishing, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264202719-en, Date of publication: 19 July 2013 
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customers in that market.  The country where the activities took place was referred to 
as the country of source and the country where the taxpayer was physically located 
was known as the country of residence.9  
The global market has evolved and cross-border trade in services10 now exceeds 
trade in goods.11 12 The tax rules have not kept pace with global developments and 
consequently has resulted in the tax rules for services being less developed and 
uniform than the rules for trade in goods.13 
MNEs with cross-border transactions find themselves confronted with a number of 
difficulties such as excessive documentation requirements, increased risk of penalties 
and economic double taxation, the costs of temporarily having to finance the same 
tax burden twice and increased auditing by the tax authorities.   MNEs also operate 
in an uncertain environment as business structures which have been in place for a 
number of years and which were accepted by the tax authorities are no longer 
acceptable from a tax point of view.  It is also not uncommon that a certain structure 
and/or transfer price (or the application of a specific method) might be acceptable in 
one jurisdiction but not in another. 
 
                                               
 
9 Schön, W., International Tax Coordination for the Second-Best World (Part I), World Tax Journal, 2009 (Volume 1), 
No. 1, Published online: 1 October 2009 
10 Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters stated at the Ninth Session in its report, 
Taxation of cross-border trade in service: A review of the current international tax landscape and the possible future 
of policy options, the following: 
“As the transaction value of services increases so too does the need to accurately categorise the various types of 
services into meaningful sectors or divisions’’. 
The General Agreement of Trade on Services (GATS) employs the Services Sectoral Classification List (“W120 
List”) of the WTO, which includes the following 12 discrete service sectors: 
 Business services; 
 Communication services; 
 Construction and related engineering services; 
 Distribution services; 
 Educational services; 
 Environmental services; 
 Financial services; 
 Health related and social services; 
 Tourism and travel related services; 
 Recreational, cultural and sporting services; 
 Transport services; 
 Other services not included elsewhere. 
(See The World Trade Organisation, “MTN.GNS/W/120”, 1991) 
11 Refer to the comment made by General Reporter, Ariane Pickering, at the 66th Congress of the International 
Fiscal Association (“IFA”) in Boston, 1 October 2012 
12 The service sector accounts for approximately 70% if the world’s Gross Domestic Product.  Refer to 2012 date, 
The World Bank, 2009 - 2013, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/nv.srv.tetc.zs, accessed on 27 April 2014 
13 Pickering, A., note 11 
 4 
2. Effects of globalisation 
Globalisation has had a major impact not only on countries but on business as well.  
MNEs are obliged to align and coordinate local operations based in various 
jurisdictions with the global corporate strategy in order to operate effectively.  As a 
result, the majority of MNEs incur significant general and administrative expenses 
related to headquarter services and other services14 on behalf of their foreign 
affiliates. 
Many developing countries have also suffered the consequences of erosion of their 
tax bases as a consequence of the increased openness of national economies in the 
new technological era.  Countries are increasingly under pressure to reduce corporate 
tax rates as they compete as locations for foreign direct investment (“FDI”).  Countries 
are equally required to take the necessary action to raise revenue in order to finance 
the required and much needed growth of their economies, the needs of an ever 
increasing population as well as failing of businesses such as banks and other 
financial institutions. 
This issue is however not new.  President John F. Kennedy said the following in a 
special message to congress on taxation on 20 April 1961: 
“Recently more and more enterprises organised abroad by American firms have 
arranged their corporate structures aided by artificial arrangements between parent 
and subsidiary regarding intercompany pricing, the transfer of patent licensing rights, 
the shifting of management fees, and similar practices[…] in order to reduce 
sharply or eliminate completely their tax liabilities both at home and abroad.”15 
(author’s emphasis). 
The International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) published an article by Vito Tanzi in 2001 in 
Finance & Development, its quarterly magazine, dealing with some of the 
consequences in a tax context of globalisation16.  It stated as follows: 
“Globalization and the consequent international integration, together with rapid 
technological progress, is likely to affect both the ability of countries to collect taxes 
and the distribution of the tax burden. Moreover, as time passes, globalization's 
                                               
 
14 Examples of these other services include accounting support services, tax support services, legal support 
services, human resource services, information technology services, engineering and technical services, as well as 
procurement and logistic support services, amongst others. 
15 http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=8074, accessed on 19 February 2014 
16 Tanzi, V., Globalization and the Work of Fiscal Termites, Finance & Development, International Monetary Fund, 
March 2001, Volume 38, Number 1, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2001/03/tanzi.htm, accessed on 
19 February 2014 
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impact on tax revenues appears likely to increase and to become evident in countries' 
revenue statistics.”17 
Tanzi also stated that “(M)ost industrial countries are collecting more tax revenue 
today than they did two or three decades ago. On closer inspection, however, one 
can detect what may be called "fiscal termites" gnawing away at the foundations of 
their tax systems. These termites are part of the evolving "ecosystem" of globalization, 
and whether they will eventually severely damage the fiscal houses remains to be 
seen. It is possible that, in the future, globalization will lead to new, innovative ways 
to use technology and knowledge to raise tax revenues. This does not diminish the 
need to assess ways in which current developments are likely to affect the tax system. 
I discuss below the impact of eight termites.”18 19 
One of the so-called termites identified by Tanzi is intra-company trade.  He states 
that intra-company trade “creates problems for national tax authorities owing to the 
potential abuse of "transfer prices" by the multinationals, including on loans, the 
allocation of fixed costs, and the valuation of trademarks and patents. There is 
evidence that some enterprises manipulate prices to move profits from high-tax 
jurisdictions to those with low tax rates. Tax authorities are often at a loss on how to 
cope with this trend.  
A recent survey of the transfer-pricing policies of more than 600 multinationals 
(domiciled in 19 countries) found that these corporations saw a clear connection 
between the desire to avoid double taxation and the use of transfer pricing (Ernst & 
Young, 1999). Many countries also felt pressured to resolve the complex business 
and transfer-pricing issues arising from globalization, particularly given the growing 
attention the revenue authorities in several countries are paying to the practice.  
Many multinationals now realize that a global approach to designing and documenting 
transfer-pricing policies is desirable. An increasing number of countries are beginning 
to apply such arrangements, under which the criteria for applying arm's-length 
principles are determined in advance. The OECD recently issued an annex to its 
previously released Transfer Pricing Guidelines suggesting how to conduct 
arrangements under the so-called mutual agreement procedure (Neighbour, 1999).”20 
                                               
 
17 Tanzi, V., note 16 
18 Tanzi, V., note 16 
19 The eight termites are e-commerce and transactions, electronic money, intra-company trade, offshore financial 
centres, derivatives and hedge funds, inability to tax financial capital, growing foreign activities and foreign 
shopping. – Tanzi V., note 16 
20 European Union (“EU”), reference its 2012 consultation paper and July 5, 2012, summary report 
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Tanzi also considered various options to deal with the effects of these “termites”.  He 
suggested that a shift from global income taxation towards explicitly schedular taxes 
that tax different types of incomes (wages, rents, interest, dividends) differently, as an 
alternative tax collection process. He recognised though that this approach would 
make it possible to lower tax rates on mobile income tax bases and that it may raise 
questions about the fairness of the tax system. It would however, enable countries to 
minimize potential revenue losses from capital flight and emigration induced by high 
tax rates.21 
Institutions such as ActionAid22 and ChristianAid23 have been quite vocal in their 
criticism of the so-called “tax dodging” practices of MNEs operating in developing 
countries, often accusing the MNEs of reporting false profits or manipulating the 
pricing of intra-group services to avoid paying tax in these developing countries, i.e. 
use “profit stripping”24 practices to manipulate profits in developing countries.  The 
issue also received attention in mainstream media.25 
Profit stripping is however not only a problem affecting developing countries as is 
evident from a report submitted to the Department of Treasury of the United States of 
America during November 2007.26  Countries such as France, Germany and the 
United Kingdom also expressed their concerns regarding profit stripping practices 
undertaken by MNEs operating in their jurisdictions.27  
The objectives of some of the initiatives currently underway referred to above are 
directed at addressing issues such as the introduction of transfer pricing rules, 
                                               
 
21 EU, note 20 
22 Reports issued by ActionAid include “Clamping down on tax avoidance is fundamental to fighting world poverty, 
ActionAid tells the United Nation” (24 September 2013) and “Zambia Sugar dodges tax bill big enough to put 48 000 
children in school a year” (10 February 2013) 
23 Reports issued by ChristianAid include “The Missing Millions: The Costs of Tax Dodging to Developing Countries 
supported by the Scottish Government”, September 2009, and “False Profits: Robbing the Poor to Keep the Rich 
Tax-free”, March 2009 
24 The Tax Foundation describes “profit stripping”, also referred to as “earnings stripping”, as a process by which a 
firm reduces its overall tax liability by moving earnings from one taxing jurisdiction, typically a relatively high-tax 
jurisdiction, to another jurisdiction, typically a low-tax jurisdiction. http://taxfoundation.org/article/glossary-
international-tax-terms, accessed 21 February 2014  
25 Bloomberg’s “The Great Corporate Tax Dodge”, the New York Times’ “But Nobody Pays That”, The Times’ 
“Secrets of Tax Avoiders” and the Guardian’s “Tax Gap” 
26 Report to The Congress on Earnings Stripping, Transfer Pricing and U.S. Income Tax Treaties, Department of 
the Treasury, November 2007, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/ajca2007.pdf, 
accessed on 21 February 2014 
27 The United Kingdom’s Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne, and Germany’s Minister of Finance, 
Wolfgang Schäuble, issued a joint statement in November 2012 in which they called for co-ordinated action to 
strengthen international tax standards and urging their counterparts to back efforts by the OECD to identify possible 
gaps in tax laws issued. France’s Economy and Finance Minister, Pierre Moscovici, also joined the call. 
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including the enforcement thereof, especially in regards to intangibles28, the 
introduction of general anti-avoidance rules, consideration of the tax policy and 
compliance issues associated with so-called hybrid mismatches29, scrutinisation of 
double non-taxation30, to name but a few. 
Following highly publicised cases involving alleged profit shifting and tax avoidance 
by prominent MNEs, various calls were made for co-ordinated action to strengthen 
international tax standards and to ensure tax compliance in developed and developing 
countries alike. This issue is not only an area of focus for the G8 and the G20 but also 
for other organisations such as the OECD and the United Nations (“UN”).  Initiatives 
to enable developing countries to develop processes and strategies which will enable 
them to collect tax that is due to them are also underway.   
Various politicians have issued statements regarding international tax evasion and 
tax avoidance.  The British Prime Minister, David Cameron stated that “(W)e want to 
use the G8 to drive a more serious debate on tax evasion and tax avoidance.  This is 
an issue whose time has come.  After years of abuse, people across the planet are 
rightly calling for more action, and most importantly there is gathering political will to 
actually do something about it”.31 
The German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, stated that “(I)t’s not right that giant 
companies have huge sales here [in Germany], in all of Europe, and the United States 
and elsewhere and then only pay taxes somewhere in a tiny tax haven.  That’s why 
we’re going to fight to finally put an end to tax havens at the G8 meeting this year in 
Great Britain”.32 
Another consequence of globalisation is that it forced developing countries to 
introduce many reforms such as tax reforms in the form of reduced tariffs on 
importation or exportation of goods and exchange control reforms in order to attract 
FDI. This has a negative effect on tax revenues as the tax collected from the FDI 
                                               
 
28 Working Party 6 of the OECD, namely the project to update Chapter VI of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines 
for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, 2010 OECD, Transfer Pricing and Intangibles: Scope of the 
OECD Project, 25 January 2011.  www.oecd.org/ctp/transfer-pricing/46987988.pdf 
29 OECD 2012, Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements: Tax Policy and Compliance Issues, March 2012, 
www.oecd.org/ctp/aggressive/HYBRID_ENG_Final_October2012.pdf  
30 EU, note 20. The OECD similarly is looking at this, witness a May 2012 meeting organised by the Canadian 
Revenue Authorities for OECD member countries. This issue is linked with hybrid mismatches, addressed in the 
above mentioned OECD report, issued in spring of 2012. 
31 Prime Minister David Cameron outlines his G8 priorities at Davos, 10 April 2013, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/prime-minister-david-cameron-outlines-his-g8-priorities-at-davos, accessed 
4 May 2014  
32 Angela Merkel to launch tax haven fight from UK, 13 February 2013, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/personalfinance/consumertips/tax/9868994/Angela-Merkel-to-launch-tax-
haven-fight-from-UK.html,  accessed on 4 May 2014 
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activities were (and still are) less than the tax revenues forgone in order to attract the 
FDI.  Whilst this shortfall can in part be mitigated by a corresponding cut in fiscal 
expenditure, the countries need to increase revenue.  To do this, they need to rely on 
alternative taxes such as value-added tax, income taxes, sales taxes, etc. which 
require significant investment in tax collection infrastructure and resources to monitor 
and enforce tax legislation.33   
Most jurisdictions usually levy withholding taxes on passive income, i.e. dividends, 
interest and royalties and on active income, usually related to services, earned by 
non-residents which is from a source located in or deemed to be located in a 
jurisdiction and which is usually not connected to a permanent establishment located 
in that jurisdiction. 
3.  Withholding tax on services 
3.1. General 
There is a growing awareness on the part of developing countries of the 
risks posed by transfer pricing. Their goal in addressing these risks is 
identical to that of developed countries – to protect their tax bases while 
continuing to attract FDI and facilitate cross border trade. Add to that the 
fact that many developing countries are inexperienced in dealing with 
transfer pricing issues, and that the introduction and collection of 
withholding taxes are relatively easy to implement, it is clear why many 
developing countries have gone beyond levying withholding taxes on 
employment income and income from entertainment or sports activities by 
introducing withholding taxes on services, including technical services and 
management services (hereinafter collectively referred to as “services”), 
amongst others.34 
Payments made by MNEs operating in those countries in respect of 
services rendered by their headquarter companies or other affiliates 
located in other jurisdictions, may therefore be subject to a withholding tax 
as a consequence of these initiatives.  The withholding tax rates vary 
between 3% and 35%.35  Different rates are often applied to technical fees 
                                               
 
33 Aizenman, J. and Jinyarak, Y., Working Paper: Globalization and developing countries – a shrinking tax base?, 
Working Papers, UC Santa Cruz Economics Department, No. 615, p. 1 
34 Withholding tax on services are levied on a variety of services such as technical services, management services,  
other services, professional services, gross Income from production and distribution of films and television 
programs, insurance and reinsurance, commissions, personal transportation fares, telephone charges and internet 
charges paid, international news agencies, freight charges, assignment of the right to use containers, amongst 
others 
35 Refer to annexure 2 for country specific details  
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and fees for services, such as management services, amongst others.36  
The rates can be punitive and there are instances where the rate is 2 ½ 
times more than the corporate tax rate applicable in a country37 and 2 times 
more than the withholding tax on royalties rate in the case of technical fees 
and 2 ⅓ times more than the withholding tax on royalties in the case of 
management/service fees.38 
Whilst the reasons given by various countries do not specifically state base 
erosion as the reason for the introduction of the withholding tax on services, 
it is evident from the circumstances leading up to and surrounding the 
introduction of the withholding taxes that this could be the case.39  Some 
countries take the position that income from these services is not income 
from carrying on business or income from professional or independent 
personal services but is other income which is taxable in the source country 
if the income arises in the source country in accordance with Article 21(3) 
of the United Nations Model Tax Convention (“UN Model DTA”).40 There is 
no limitation on the source country and accordingly such tax may be 
imposed as a flat rate withholding tax on the gross amount of payment.41 
3.2. Definition of “services” 
Notwithstanding that trade in services, and in particular cross-border trade 
in services, have increased significantly, few, if any, jurisdictions, have 
incorporated a definition of services in their tax legislation.42 Some 
                                               
 
36 Refer to annexure 2  
37 Refer to annexure 3 for a comparison of the withholding tax rates on technical fees and management fees to the 
corporate tax rate on a country-by-country basis 
38 Refer to annexure 12 for a comparison of the withholding tax rates on technical fees and management fees to 
the withholding tax on royalties rate on a country-by-country basis 
39 In this regard refer to Dunst, M.C., Self-Help and Altruism: Exploring the Problem of Tax Base Erosion in 
Developing Countries, 43 Tax Management International Journal 463, International Tax Centre, Bloomberg BNA, 
8 August 2014, in which he states the following: “Historically, tax policymakers and practitioners have not tended 
to view withholding taxes as enforcement tools restraining excessive deductions.” and “Over the years, 
withholding taxes have fallen from favour among tax policymakers. Because they are imposed on the gross 
amounts of payments rather than on the basis of the taxpayer’s net income, withholding taxes are not correlated 
with a taxpayer’s ability to pay and therefore depart from commonly held perceptions of a properly functioning 
income tax.  Accordingly, withholding taxes sometimes are seen as impediments to international commerce, and 
in recent decades it has become common for countries to agree, in income tax treaties with one another, to reduce 
or (…) eliminate withholding taxes in cross-border transactions with one another.”  
40 Article 21(3) provides that “(N)otwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2, items of income of a resident 
of a Contracting State not dealt with in the foregoing Articles of this Convention and arising in the other Contracting 
State may also be taxed in that other State.” 
41 Notes of the Taxation of Services under the United Nations Model Tax Convention, United Nations, E/C. 
18/2010/CRP.7, 11 October 2010, para. 89, p. 27 
42 Russia has incorporated a definition of “services” in the Civil Code.  “Services” is defined as actions with intangible 
results that are consumed in the course of action” (Russian Tax Code, article 38(4)(5)).  The definition excludes 
“works”, i.e. actions with tangible results which are handed over to the customer, financial, rental and ancillary 
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jurisdictions, usually countries which levy a withholding tax on services, 
have issued judicial or administrative guidance on the meaning of the term. 
These include countries such as Venezuela43, Chile44, Brazil45, Kenya46, 
Namibia47, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia48, Sudan49, Uganda, Zimbabwe50 
and the Republic of South Africa51. 
Definitions of the term used in a transfer pricing context are not helpful as 
these are often very broad.52  For example, Australia has defined the terms 
                                               
 
arrangements, i.e. granting of loans, insurance, leases, granting rights to use intellectual property, warranties etc., 
as well as the assignment of rights. See Enterprise services – Russia, IFA Cahiers 2012 – Volume 97A, p. 582 
43 Venezuelan jurisprudence interprets “services” as meaning “any independent activity consisting of executing 
certain remunerated events, actions, contracts or works in favour of a third party who receives such services”. See 
Enterprise services – Venezuela, IFA Cahiers 2012 – Volume 97A, p. 749 
44 The Chilean tax authorities take a similar approach to that of the Venezuelan tax authorities but added the 
requirement that the services have to be performed by a “person”. See Enterprise services – Chile, IFA Cahiers 
2012 – Volume 97A, p. 195.  Also refer to Chilean VAT Law, article 2, para. 1, no. 2 
45 Brazilian case law (case no. 116, 121) suggests that the provision of services encompasses all obligations 
undertaken by one party to perform some activities for the benefit of the contractor. See Enterprise services – Brazil,  
IFA Cahiers 2012 – Volume 97A, p. 158 
46 A management or professional fee is defined as a “payment made to a person, other than a payment made to 
an employee by his employer, as consideration for managerial, technical, agency, contractual, professional or 
consultancy services, however calculated”, Omondi, F., Kenya - Corporate Taxation, section 6, Country Surveys 
IBFD, accessed 30 April 2014 
47 A management or consultancy fee is defined as “any amount payable for administrative, managerial, technical 
or consultative services or any similar services, whether such services are of a professional nature of not”, Amos 
J., Namibia - Corporate Taxation, section 6, Country Surveys IBFD, accessed 30 April 2014 
48 Management fees are defined by the regulations as “payments made for management services, such as 
payments made under contracts to run enterprises such as hotels, ships, etc.  The fees are distinguished between 
headquarter company expenses etc.  Technical services include payments for technical or scientific services, 
regardless of their nature, including studies and research in different fields, prospecting works of a scientific, 
geological or industrial nature, consulting services; supervisory activities and engineering services of all kinds 
including plans and design.”, S. Gueydi, S., Saudi Arabia - Corporate Taxation, section 6, Country Surveys IBFD, 
accessed 30 April 2014 
49 Management fees are defined as “payments to a person in accordance with a contract performing managerial 
services to the taxpayer.  Professional fees are defined as payments to another person in return for performing 
technical consulting services for the taxpayer.” Namubiru, P. and Munyandi, K., Uganda - Corporate Taxation, 
section 6, Country Surveys IBFD, accessed 30 April 2014  
50 “Fees” means any amount from a source within Zimbabwe payable in respect of any services of a technical, 
managerial, administrative or consultative nature, but does not include any such amount payable in respect of:  
 services rendered to an individual unconnected with his business affairs; 
 education or technical training; 
 the repair of goods outside Zimbabwe; 
 any project which is specified for these purposes by the Minister by notice in a statutory instrument; 
 any project which is the subject of any agreement entered into by the government of Zimbabwe with any 
other government or international organization in terms of which any person is entitled to exemption from 
tax in respect of such amount; 
 services rendered to a licensed investor in respect of his operations in an export processing zone; or 
 services rendered to an industrial park developer in respect of the operation of his industrial park., 
Munyandi, K., Zimbabwe - Corporate Taxation, section 6, Country Surveys IBFD, accessed 30 April 2014 
51 South Africa intends to introduce a withholding tax on service fees payable to any person that is not a resident 
with effect from 1 January 2016.  The legislation includes a definition of service fees for this purpose which reads 
“”service fees” means any amount that is received or accrued in respect of technical services, managerial services 
and consultancy fees but does not include services incidental to the imparting of or the undertaking to impart any 
scientific, technical, industrial or commercial knowledge or information, or the rendering of or undertaking to render 
any assistance or service in connection with the application or utilisation of such knowledge or information.” Section 
51A to be inserted into the Income Tax Act, No 58 of 1962, with effect from 1 January 2016 
52 Enterprise services – General Report, IFA Cahiers 2012 – Volume 97A, p. 26 
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“services” for purposes of its transfer pricing rules as including “any rights, 
benefits, privileges or facilities that are, or are to be, provided, granted or 
conferred under any one of those agreements. The first category of 
agreement is one for or in relation to the performance of work including 
work of a professional nature; the provision of or the use or enjoyment of 
facilities for amusement entertainment recreation or instruction; the 
conferring of rights, benefits or privileges for which consideration is payable 
in the form of a royalty, tribute, levy or similar exactions; or the carriage, 
storage or packaging of any property or the doing of any other act in 
relation to property. The second category is agreements of insurance; the 
third, agreements between banks and customers, and the fourth, 
agreements for or in relation to the lending of moneys.”53 
The OECD does not offer a definition of the term54 but acknowledges that 
“(N)early every MNE group must arrange for a wide scope of services to 
be available to its members, in particular administrative, technical, financial 
and commercial services. Such services may include management, 
coordination and control functions for the whole group. The cost of 
providing such services may be borne initially by the parent, by a specially 
designated group member (“a group service centre”), or by another group 
member. An independent enterprise in need of a service may acquire the 
services from a service provider who specialises in that type of service or 
may perform the service for itself (i.e. in house). In a similar way, a member 
of an MNE group in need of a service may acquire it directly or indirectly 
from independent enterprises, or from one or more associated enterprises 
in the same MNE group (i.e. intra-group), or may perform the service for 
itself. Intra-group services often include those that are typically available 
externally from independent enterprises (such as legal and accounting 
services), in addition to those that are ordinarily performed internally (e.g. 
                                               
 
53 Section 136AA of the Federal Income Tax Assessments Act of 1936 
54 Paragraphs 11.2, 11.3 and 11.4 of the Commentary on Article 12 of the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income 
and Capital distinguishes the provision of services from provision of know-how as follows: 
“11.2 This type of contract thus differs from contracts for the provision of services, in which one of the parties 
undertakes to use the customary skills of his calling to execute work for himself for the other party. Payments 
made under the latter contracts generally fall under Article 7.” (i.e. the Business Profits Article). It continues in 
paragraph 11.3 as follows: “… payments for the provision of services sometimes gives rise to practical difficulties.  
The following criteria are relevant for the purpose of making that distinction: 
- In the case of contracts for the provision of services, the supplier undertakes to perform services which may 
require the use, by that supplier, of special knowledge, skill and expertise but not the transfer of such special 
knowledge, skill or expertise to the other party.”.  Various examples of the provision of services are given in 
paragraph 11.4, which includes payments for pure technical assistance, opinions given by engineers, lawyers or 
accountants, amongst others.  See OECD (2012), Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital 2010 
(updated 2010), pp. C(12)-8 – C(12)-9, OECD Publishing. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/978926417517-en 
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by an enterprise for itself, such as central auditing, financing advice, or 
training of personnel).”55 
The OECD further acknowledges that “(I)ntra-group service activities may 
vary considerably among MNE groups, as does the extent to which those 
activities provide a benefit, or expected benefit, to one or more group 
members. Each case is dependent upon its own facts and circumstances 
and the arrangements within the group. For example, in a decentralised 
group, the parent may limit its intragroup activity to monitoring its 
investments in its subsidiaries in its capacity as a shareholder. In contrast, 
in a centralised or integrated group, the board of directors and senior 
management of the parent company may make all important decisions 
concerning the affairs of its subsidiaries and the parent company may carry 
out all marketing, training and treasury functions.”56 
The term “management fee” is used in the context of transfer pricing to 
describe compensation paid for intra-group services although the term is 
not defined in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises and Tax Administrations (“OECD Guidelines”). 
The United Nations Practical Manual on Transfer Pricing for Developing 
Countries (“UN Transfer Pricing Manual”) refers to both “service fees”57 and 
“management fees”58 but offers no definition of the terms. 
The World Trade Organisation defines services broadly in Article 1(2) of its 
General Agreement on Trade in Services59 as “the supply of a service: 
(a) from the territory of one Member into the territory of any other 
Member; 
(b) in the territory of one Member to the service consumer of any of 
the Member; 
(c) by a service supplier of one Member, through commercial 
presence in the territory of any other Member; 
                                               
 
55 OECD (2010), OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations 2010, 
OECD Publishing, 2010, para. 7.2, p. 205, (“OECD Guidelines”) 
56 OECD, note 55, para. 7.4, p. 206 
57 United Nations Practical Manual on Transfer Pricing for Developing Countries (“UN Transfer Pricing Manual”), 
United Nations (“UN”), para. 8.3.4.1., p. 297 
58 UN, note 57, para. 7.4.6.12., p. 281 
59 Article 1 of the General Agreement on Trade in Services, World Trade Organisation 
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(d) by a service supplier of one Member, through presence of natural 
persons of a Member in the territory of any other Member. 
(3) For the purposes of this Agreement: 
(b) “services” include any service in any sector except services 
supplied in the exercise of governmental authority;” 
The type of services considered in this paper would typically include the 
following: 
 Financial consulting;  
 Personnel strategy; 
 Business advisory services; 
 Corporate affairs; 
 Marketing;  
 Technical consulting; 
 Computer advisory services and data processing; 
 Intellectual property services but excluding royalties; and 
 Such other services as parties may agree upon.60 
One of the author’s concerns is that the agreements referred to above often 
cover both technical services and other services whereas most countries 
distinguish between technical fees and services or management fees in 
order to determine whether withholding tax is due and/or which rate to 
apply.61 
Activities typically excluded from the service agreements are services 
rendered that constitute shareholder services, i.e. any activity by a service 
provider merely because of its ownership interest (i.e. in its capacity as 
                                               
 
60Detailed examples of the services typically included in these types of agreements can be found in  annexure 4 
61 A detailed discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this paper 
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shareholder) to meet its regulatory and governance obligations and those 
to its shareholders, or research and development services.62 
MNEs often provide these services from a central point to a number of its 
affiliates and where appropriate charge the affiliates or subsidiaries for the 
services rendered.  It is not unusual for the services to be provided by a 
centralised service-providing entity which is an affiliate of the headquarter 
company.  This does however not mean that the functions are all performed 
from the centralised location.  Specialist areas may be spread across the 
various entities based in various countries in which the group operates, 
depending on the specific needs of the group and location of its resources.  
This necessitate the need for tight controls over the service fees levied, not 
only from a tax perspective but also from a financial and accounting 
perspective, to ensure that the fees earned and expenditure incurred are 
reflected in the correct company. 
It is also not uncommon for the centralised service entity of MNEs to enter 
into an agreement with an independent third party service provider to 
render services to the affiliates or subsidiaries in the group. These types of 
arrangements often benefit either the MNEs, as they are able to negotiate 
a reduced rate, or the third party service providers.  This is especially 
relevant where services are to be provided to entities in developing 
countries, as the third party service providers are often small enterprises 
and any undue delay in settlement of their invoices may impact significantly 
on their businesses and ability to continue to operate in a sustainable 
manner.63 
3.3. Source of services rendered 
Whilst the source of income for services rendered usually determines 
which jurisdiction has the right to tax the income generated from the 
                                               
 
62 Per the OECD, the following examples will constitute shareholder/stewardship activities: costs of activities 
relating to the juridical structure of the parent company itself, such as meetings of shareholders of the parent, issuing 
of shares in the parent company and costs of the supervisory board; costs relating to reporting requirements of the 
parent company including the consolidation of reports; and costs of raising funds for the acquisition of its 
participations. See OECD Guidelines, OECD, 2010, para. 7.10, pp. 207 – 208.  The Canadians take a similar 
position in a Circular, IC 87-2R, in which it identifies the following costs as costs that should not be charged to other 
group members, i.e. costs incurred for the sole benefit of shareholders; costs relating to the legal structure of the 
general financial reporting requirements of the specific group; and costs pertaining to functions that are duplicated.  
The United States of America also provides guidance in a technical advice memorandum, TAM 8806002 in which 
it provides that the following services are regarded as stewardship activities: duplicative review or performance of 
activities already undertaken by a subsidiary; periodic visits and general review of a subsidiary’s performance; 
complying with reporting requirements or other legal requirements of the parent shareholder; and financing re 
refinancing the parent’s ownership participation in the subsidiary. 
63 These services are also affected by withholding tax on services as the withholding tax on services are often not 
limited to intra-group cross border transactions 
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provision of services, the determination of the source varies significantly.  
This is due to the fact that the term “source” is often not defined, or at best, 
vaguely defined.  Some jurisdictions consider the source of income to be 
the place where the services were performed whereas others consider it to 
be the place where the contract has been entered into or even the place 
where payment is made.64  It is not uncommon for the source to be 
prescribed to be that of a specific jurisdiction purely based on the type of 
services rendered.65  Put differently, the term “source” is used for a motley 
collection of justifications for allocating tax jurisdiction and this often makes 
discussion burdensome because people use the same term to express 
different concepts.66 
In the past, the majority of jurisdictions traditionally accepted that the origin 
or originating cause justifies the levying of tax on income generated or 
created within the territory of the taxing state.  This can be described in 
various ways, such as “the place of income-generating activity”67 or “the 
place where the economic activities creating the income occur”.  For 
example, the originating cause for income from services rendered in terms 
of South African law is the services rendered and the source is located 
where the particular services are rendered, irrespective of the place where 
the contract was entered into or the payment for the services are made.68  
Whilst the meaning of source may be clear for domestic tax purposes within 
a jurisdiction, the situation is not clear from an international tax perspective 
as there are no international source rules that are of general application. 
One would therefore expect that in the context of non-residents, the 
general justification for a source-based taxation is based on the premise 
that the jurisdiction which provided the public goods, i.e. infrastructure, and 
services offered which enabled a non-resident to undertake an economic 
activity which generated income, should be entitled to tax the income.  This 
implies that the non-resident needs to have some sort of presence in the 
jurisdiction in order to take advantage of the public goods and services 
offered by the government of the jurisdiction wishing to tax the income.  
                                               
 
64 Honiball, M. and Olivier, L., International Tax: A South African Perspective – 2011, SiberInk, Fifth Edition, p.15 
65 See annexure 2 for details of the various basis of levying withholding tax on services 
66 Kemmeren, E.C.C.M. Prof. Dr, Source of Income in Globalizing Economies: Overview of the Issues and a Plea 
for an Origin-Based Approach, International Tax Bulletin, IBFD, November 2006, p. 432 
67 Vogel, K., Worldwide vs source taxation of income – A review and re-evaluation of arguments (Part I), 
Intertax 216, Nos 8/9, 1988, p. 223 
68 CIR v Lever Brothers & Unilever Ltd, (1946) 14 SATC 1, 1946 AD 441 
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The mere export of goods or services by a non-resident from another 
jurisdiction to the domestic jurisdiction should not be liable for tax in the 
domestic jurisdiction on the income generated from that sale or provision 
of services as the simple export of goods or services by a non-resident to 
the domestic jurisdiction does not involve or create any presence in the 
domestic jurisdiction of the non-resident.69 
“Source” needs to be determined by looking at where the income or wealth 
is produced, in a physical or economic sense, i.e. the origin of the income 
or wealth produced must be determined.70  
However, as domestic source rules will determine the source of any 
income, it is possible that more than one jurisdiction can claim the right to 
tax an amount based on its interpretation of source.  Juridical Double 
Taxation71 can therefore occur as a so-called source-source conflict may 
arise. The existence of a double tax treaty between the affected 
jurisdictions is often not helpful in these situations as most double tax 
treaties also do not include source rules to overcome this problem. 
The OECD’s view on the right to tax in general and the right to tax income 
in respect of services rendered is that the country of residence should have 
the right to tax.  This is due to the fact that the premise upon which the 
OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital (“the OECD Model 
DTA”) is written, and the interests of the members of the OECD which the 
OECD Model DTA serves, is appropriate for developed countries. 
The OECD Model DTA does not serve the interests of developing countries 
as income is diverted from the developing countries to the developed 
countries where developing countries trade with developed countries.  This 
is due to the fact that the OECD Model DTA is designed to minimize income 
that would be allocated to the source country whilst the majority of the 
income is allocated to the country of residence. The developing country, 
often the source country, is therefore a “net loser” of tax revenues.  This 
                                               
 
69 Holmes, K., International Tax Policy and Double Tax Treaties: An Introduction to Principles and Application, IBFD 
(2007), pp. 20 – 21  
70 Holmes, K., note 69, p. 21 
71 International Juridical Double Taxation is generally defined as the imposition of comparable taxes in two (or 
more) States on the same taxpayer in respect of the same subject matter and for identical periods.  Its harmful 
effects on the exchange of goods and services and movements of capital, technology and persons are well known 
that it is scarcely necessary to stress the importance of removing the obstacles that double taxation presents to the 
development of economic relations between countries. (OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Model Tax Convention 
on Income and Capital, Paris, OECD, 2007, p. 7) 
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resulted in the disenchantment of developing countries with the OECD 
Model DTA. 
The developing countries sought recourse to the UN to develop a model 
double tax agreement (“DTA”) which would reflect their interests.  The 
United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed 
and Developing Countries (“the UN Model DTA”) was introduced which 
aims to allocate a large portion of the income to the source country and a 
lesser portion to the country of residence which is in line with the objective 
of developing countries to levy tax on the basis of source. 
The allocation of a source country’s right to tax income from services under 
the provisions of the UN Model DTA is conditional on the satisfaction of a 
threshold requirement.  The threshold is typically based on a quantitative 
and/or qualitative evaluation of a non-resident’s involvement in the 
economic and commercial life of the source country.  As regards income 
from services that are business profits, such as the services dealt with in 
this paper, the non-resident service provider should have a permanent 
establishment in the source country or furnish services in the source 
country for the same or a connected project for more than 6 months.72 
The ultimate results sought by the OECD and the UN was essentially that 
the source countries would earn routine profits and the residence country 
would earn residual profits which are usually made up of “supply chain 
transaction costs”, lease transfer payments, interest transfer payments, 
royalty transfer payments and service transactions between the MNEs 
holding company based in the residence country and the operating 
company based in the source country.73  The existing provisions of the UN 
Model DTA dealing with services, generally does not entitle the source 
country to tax income from services performed outside the source country.  
The source country is therefore not entitled to tax income from services 
performed outside the country even if the services are consumed in the 
source country.74 
Globalisation has had an impact on the “source” of income as it has 
resulted in the shift in the location of various sources of income.  This is 
                                               
 
72 Notes of the Taxation of Services under the United Nations Model Tax Convention, United Nations (“UN”), E/C. 
18/2010/CRP.7, 11 October 2010, para. 26, pp. 9 – 10 
73 Lowell, C. H. and Wells, B., Tax Base Defence: History and Reality, International Transfer Pricing Journal, 
March/April 2013, p. 74 
74 UN, note 57, para. 29, p. 10 
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due to the fact that globalisation has made it possible to have production 
and distribution activities in different locations.  As regards services, new 
technologies provide new methods of communication which means that 
services providers are no longer required to be in the same location as their 
service consumers. Physical presence is no longer required to conduct 
business or provide services.  
Mr Brian Arnold stated in the Notes of the Taxation of Services under the 
United Nations Model Tax Convention that, in his view, “the fixed-place-of-
business threshold (i.e., PE or fixed base) that applies to the source 
country taxation of business profits is clearly inappropriate for income 
from services.  That threshold was adopted at a time when most cross-
border business activity involved the manufacture or production and sale 
of goods.  In the modern economy cross-border services are much more 
important.  Such services can usually be performed without the need for 
any fixed place of business and certainly without the need for a permanent 
(more than 6 months) fixed place of business.”75 (author’s emphasis). 
Paragraph 9 of the Commentary on Article 7 of the UN Model DTA states 
that “it has come to be accepted in international fiscal matters that until an 
enterprise of one State sets up a permanent establishment in another State 
it should not properly be regarded as participating in the economic life of 
that other State’s taxing rights.”76  Base erosion considerations however 
seems to justify a lower or no threshold for source country tax, usually in 
the case of employment income and income from entertainment or sports 
activities.77 
Many developing countries and some international institutions hold the 
view that source taxation is appropriate and justified but it creates problems 
where the developing countries rely on FDI. This is due to the fact that FDI 
tends to leave these countries with substantial net outflows of capital 
income which leads to a persistent deficit on current financial flows.  
Traditional withholding taxes, taxation of the subsidiaries located in their 
jurisdiction and permanent establishments of foreign enterprises provide 
these countries with the opportunity to obtain a substantial tax base from 
the outflows of income from capital.  The concern however is that the shift 
in the location of economic activity as a result of globalisation will, and has, 
                                               
 
75 UN, note 57, para. 53, p. 18 
76 UN, note 57, para. 57, p. 19 
77 UN, note 57, para. 58, p. 19 
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resulted in more goods and services being sold/consumed in developing 
countries without the seller needing to be physically present or having a 
physical presence in that country.78 
In applying the principles to determine the source of income from services 
rendered, it used to be generally accepted that the source will be the 
jurisdiction in which the services are performed. However, as withholding 
tax on services is seen as an opportunity to expand the tax base of a 
country, traditional source rules are often not applied. An analysis of the 
conditions giving rise to a liability for withholding tax on technical fees and 
management or other services fees indicate that a significant number of 
countries levy withholding tax on services on payment, irrespective of the 
location from which the services were rendered, if the service was 
consumed in the country, if a local person or entity benefitted from the 
service rendered, if the service gave rise to income sourced in the 
jurisdiction, amongst various others.79   
3.3.1. Recent court decisions dealing with source of 
management/ service fees 
This principle was challenged in the courts of a number of 
countries, some of which are dealt with below.  A major 
concern is that the varied outcomes of decisions reached by 
courts and varied views expressed in international 
commentaries and practices makes it difficult, if not 
impossible, to predict “source” and hence the treatment of 
cross-border services for tax purposes.  
India 
India has been the most active state in respect of litigation 
dealing with the source of cross-border services.  On the 
whole, the courts apply very broad principles when interpreting 
the provisions of the treaties, with decisions usually favouring 
                                               
 
78 Roxan, I., Limits to Globalisation: Some Implications for Taxation, Tax Policy, and the Developing World, LSE 
Law Society and Economy Working Papers 3/2012, London School of Economics and Political Science, Law 
Department, p. 40 
79 See annexure 2 for details of conditions giving rise to liability for or basis for levying withholding tax on technical 
fees and management fees or service fees, 
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the interpretation of the tax authorities.  Some of the prominent 
cases80 include  
 Ashapura Minichem Limited v. ADIT81 in which the 
court held that the utilization of the services in India is 
sufficient to warrant the taxability of the services in 
India.  The court further held that the provision of article 
12(6) of the treaty between India and China provides 
that the payment for the service fees determines the 
source of the services to be located in India irrespective 
of the location from which the service are rendered: 
 Linklaters LLP, UK v. ITO82 in which the court held that 
indirect attribution of the services rendered to the 
permanent establishment (“PE”) incorporates the force 
of attraction principle.83 This means that any services 
rendered by Linklaters to its clients in India by the 
taxpayer, even where they were not rendered by the 
PE, were to be regarded as indirectly attributable to the 
PE and thus taxable in India; and 
 Clifford Chance v. ADIT84 in which the ITAT held that 
the taxpayer's income attributable to the work 
performed outside India was exempt from tax in India 
under article 7(1) of the treaty.  
Tanzania 
The Revenue Appeals Tribunal (“the RAT”) handed down a 
decision on 15 August 2013 in the case of Tullow Tanzania BV 
v Commissioner General, Tanzania Revenue Authority 
                                               
 
80 See annexure 5 for details of the cases 
81 Ashapura Minichem Limited v. ADIT, Income Tax Appeal No. 2508/Mum/2008 
82 Linklaters LLP, UK v. ITO, Income Tax Appeal Nos 4896/Mum/03 and 5058/Mum/03 
83 Subsequent to this decision, the Special Bench of the Tribunal dealing with another case, ADIT v. Clifford 
Chance, Income Tax Appeal No 2060-61/Mum/2008, Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Special Bench, Mumbai, held 
that article 7(1) of the tax treaty between UK and India is materially different from article 7(1) of the UN Model. The 
treaty between the UK and India did not incorporate the force of attraction principle.  This means that the services 
rendered to clients in India not rendered in India should not be regarded as indirectly attributable to the PE in India 
and as such are not taxable in India. 
84 Clifford Chance v. ADIT, Income Tax Appeal No 2060-61/Mum/2008, Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Special 
Bench, Mumbai 
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(“Tullow Tanzania case”).85 86 The facts of the case are as 
follows:  
Tullow Tanzania BV (“Tullow”) is a company registered in 
Tanzania and carries out offshore oil and gas exploration 
activities. In carrying out these activities, Tullow sent raw 
seismic data to contractors in Ireland (a separate legal entity) 
for processing and production of seismic sections.  The 
seismic sections are sent to South Africa to another separate 
legal entity for interpretation and the results are sent back to 
Tullow for execution of the drilling programme.  The Tanzania 
Revenue Authority (“the TRA”) carried out an audit and raised 
an assessment for withholding tax due on the payments made 
to the contractors in Ireland and South Africa. 
The Tanzania Income Tax Act provides that service fees are 
sourced in Tanzania if they are paid for services rendered in 
Tanzania. 
The TRA argued that the location of consumption of the 
services is critical and not the location of performance of the 
services, i.e. in this instance Ireland and South Africa. RAT 
found in favour of TRA that payments made to Ireland and 
South Africa in respect of services are subject to withholding 
tax in Tanzania as the services were rendered to Tullow which 
is located in Tanzania. The decision has not been well-
received as it disregards the Tanzanian source rules – in fact, 
it did not deal with it at all – which require the services to be 
rendered in Tanzania by a non-resident before the withholding 
tax can apply and the purpose of section 69 of the Tanzanian 
Tax Act which is to bring into the tax net non-residents who 
come into the country to provide services, and earn income as 
a result, and who then leave the country without paying any 
income tax. The decision is under appeal and is expected to 
be heard sometime during 2014.  
                                               
 
85 Tullow Tanzania BV – Appellant and Commissioner General, TRA – Respondent, Appeal No. 7 of 2013 between 
the United Republic of Tanzania in the Revenue Appeals Tribunal, Dar Es Salaam. 
86 See annexure 5 for further details of this case 
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Neither the Tax Revenue Appeals Board (“TRAB”)87 nor the 
RAT dealt with one of the grounds of objection and in the 
appeal that the assessment of withholding tax on services 
performed by a South African entity contravenes the tax treaty 
between South Africa and Tanzania. 
Brazil 
The source of services rendered has been considered in a 
number of cases in Brazil such as Inter Partner Assistance 
Prestadora de Seviҫos de Assistência 24 Horas Ltda. (“Inter 
Partner”)88 and Copesul – CIA/Petroquimica do Sul 
(“Copesul”)89.90 Following the decisions by the courts in these 
matters, the General Office of the National Treasury's Attorney 
(Procuradoria-Geral da Fazenda Nacional – PGFN) recently 
changed its position on the application of tax treaties for the 
avoidance of double taxation on outbound payments for the 
rendering of technical services without transfer of technology.  
In the past, the PGFN and the Federal Revenue Office 
(Receita Federal do Brasil – RFB) published Normative 
Opinion 776/2011 and Declaratory Act 1/2000 providing, in a 
nutshell, that tax treaties signed by Brazil do not prevent the 
levying of withholding tax on these types of outbound 
payments. Accordingly, the amounts paid for the rendering of 
technical services without the transfer of technology would not 
fall within the concept of "business profits", as stated in article 
7 of tax treaties signed by Brazil, since these amounts are 
defined as "revenue" of the foreign beneficiary under Brazilian 
domestic law. As a result, those payments would fall within the 
scope of the "other income" article, which in the case of tax 
treaties signed by Brazil generally diverges from the OECD 
Model DTA by allowing taxation at source.  
                                               
 
87 Tullow Tanzania BV – Appellant and Commissioner General  – Respondent, Income Tax Appeal Case No. 10 of 
2011, Tax Revenue Appeals Board, Lindi 
88 Inter Partner Assistance Prestadora de Seviҫos de Assistência 24 Horas Ltda. v. Federal Union (National 
Treasury), Case 0024461-74.2005.4.03.6100 
89 Copesul – CIA/Petroquimica do Sul v. Federal Union (National Treaury), Case RE 1.161.467 – RS  
90 See annexure 5 for details of these cases 
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Normative Opinion 2,363/2013, recently made available by the 
PGFN, revisited the issue and established that, for the 
purposes of applying tax treaties, the definition of business 
profits of foreign enterprises should comprise the payments 
made by Brazilian sources for the rendering of technical 
services without transfer of technology. Thus, as a general 
rule, PGFN has recognized that article 7 of tax treaties signed 
by Brazil prevents the levying of withholding taxes on such 
payments, unless attributable to a permanent establishment 
situated in Brazil.  
4. Treaties and fees for technical and other similar services 
Both the OECD Model DTA and the UN Model DTA distinguish between business 
income and investment income.  Income from business income, which should include 
services, is usually taxable on a net basis, i.e. provision is made for the deduction of 
expenditure incurred to produce the income whereas investment income, such as 
dividends, interest and royalties, is subject to a withholding tax which is a final tax and 
is determined on the gross amount before taking into account any expenditure 
incurred in the production of that income. 
The distinction between business income and investment income has however 
become problematic in respect of technical and other similar fees for services.  
Jurisdictions which perceive that the payment of these fees create an erosion of their 
tax base have included specific provisions dealing with payments of this nature on 
their recently negotiated treaties or protocols to treaties in force.91 92 93 These 
                                               
 
91 Refer to details of countries which have either negotiated for the inclusion of certain fees in some of their treaties 
or consider the fees to be dealt with in the treaties in annexure 2 
92 At the eighth session of the Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters of the United 
Nations held in October 2012, it was decided to develop a new technical services article for inclusion within the 
Model Convention.  Some of the issues to be addressed in the new technical services article will be: 
 A definition or a framework of what could qualify as “technical services”; 
 Consideration of the modality of how the service is performed, including whether there is a need for 
physical presence in the source country.  If that is the case, the threshold time for such presence must be 
determined; and 
 Consideration whether the fact that payment for services is simply borne by the resident of the source 
country or a permanent establishment situated therein should warrant the allocation of taxing rights to the 
source country 
(See United Nations, “Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters”, Report on the eighth 
session (15 – 19 October 2012) at page 13) 
93 China has endorsed the addition of a new article on technical services to the United Nation’s Model Tax 
Convention in order to achieve fairer taxation from services performed in source states. It is of the opinion that the 
approach has the advantage of being more relevant and appropriate and would assist developing countries to 
negotiate their treaties in a manner that will preserve their taxing rights.  The new article should define technical 
services, address whether there is a need for physical presence in the source country and address whether the fact 
that a resident of a source country or PE located in that source country simply makes payment for the services 
rendered should warrant allocating taxing rights to that country. See article by Bell, K. A., Chinese Tax Official 
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provisions often allow them to tax these fees on a gross basis94 or results in a 
reduction of the withholding tax rate applicable.95  
However, some developing countries levy a withholding tax on services 
notwithstanding that a treaty may prevent them from doing so.96 
As noted above, some jurisdictions deem the source of management fees to be in 
their jurisdictions if payment is made for such services by an entity located in that 
jurisdiction or if the entity which benefitted from the service is located in their 
jurisdiction.  The location from which the services were rendered is ignored.  This 
inevitably results in source v source conflicts if the jurisdiction from which the services 
were rendered also claims that it is the source from which the income was 
generated.97 
Whilst these situations could be addressed in cases where there are treaties in place 
between the affected jurisdictions which deal with technical or other services, it may 
not always be the case as a significant number of treaties do not include an article 
which deals with these matters or there is a reluctance on the part of some 
jurisdictions to address these disputes with the other conflicting jurisdictions.98 
What is clear is that a withholding tax on services is an easily managed tax suitable 
for many developing countries where the tax authorities have limited capacity.  As 
such it is an effective avoidance measure which offers some protection of their tax 
base, albeit often applied in respect of deemed source rules which conflict with that 
of developed countries.99 
Once it is established that services are being provided and having decided who has 
taxing rights, it must be determined whether the price charged for the service is 
appropriate. 
 
                                               
 
Endorses Adding New Services Article to UN Model Treaty, Bloomberg BNA International Tax Centre, 22 Transfer 
Pricing Report, 914, published on 28 November 2013. 
94 UN, note 57, para. 88, p. 27 
95 See annexure 2 
96 For example Tanzania following the judgement delivered in the Tullow Tanzania case (note 81). Brazil does not 
grant relief notwithstanding any treaty which may provide otherwise 
97 See details provided in annexure 2 
98 Refer to note 96 
99 See annexure 6 for details of a situation which applies specifically in respect of the latest South Africa-
Mozambique treaty as a result of textual differences contained in the definition of “permanent establishment” as it 
appears in the English and Portuguese versions of treaty. 
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5. Transfer pricing developments 
Transfer pricing has been and is still used to some extent as a tax avoidance 
mechanism by MNEs to manipulate profits earned in the various jurisdictions in which 
they operate so as to minimise the overall tax liability of the group.  This manipulation 
can only be achieved if the income and its source is effectively moved from one 
jurisdiction to another with a more favourable tax rate or tax regime than the first 
jurisdiction. 
Transfer pricing became the focus of a small number of countries in the 1960s and 
1970s and is currently considered to be the most important mechanism to achieve tax 
avoidance through the manipulation of profits. Almost all countries have domestic tax 
provisions, either general or specific, endorsing the arm’s length principle and which 
allow the tax authorities to adjust prices which deviate from this principle.100 Specific 
provisions are usually referred to as “transfer pricing provisions”.101 
Working Party No. 6 of the Committee on Fiscal Affairs of the OECD (“Working Party 
No. 6”) is dealing with the transfer pricing aspects of intangibles, including MNE 
activities such as services. Issues being considered are how risk is actually distributed 
among members of an MNE, whether transfer pricing principles should recognise 
contractual allocations of risk, what level of economic substance is required in respect 
of contractual allocations of risk including managerial capacity to control the risks and 
to bear the costs associated with the risks identified as well as whether any 
indemnification payment is required where risk is allocated between member 
entities.102  
6. Transfer pricing principles 
6.1. General 
The determination of appropriate charges for intra-group cross border 
service fees has recently become the focus of tax authorities performing 
tax investigations into the affairs of MNEs as it is alleged that service fees 
are often used by MNEs to manipulate profits in high-tax jurisdictions, i.e. 
services fees are used as a means of profit-stripping. 
                                               
 
100 Cottani, G., Transfer Pricing, Topical Analyses IBFD, 4. The Arm’s Length Principle and the Origin of the 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines, accessed 30 April 2014 
101 See annexure 7 for details of the application of the arm’s length principle and transfer pricing in various countries 
102 Van den Brekel, R., Global: Transfer Pricing and the OECD project on BEPS, International Tax Review, 
12 June 2013 
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Whilst scrutiny of the levels of service fees may be justified in 
circumstances where MNEs do not adhere to responsible tax governance 
principles and apply aggressive tax planning structures to exploit 
opportunities to extract profits from high-tax jurisdictions, general 
scepticism of the reasonability and “validity” of service fees are often 
unreasonable and unfounded. 
The services provided vary significantly between non-connected taxpayers 
as well as the services provided within a group, which makes it difficult to 
find comparable prices for the services rendered or to satisfactorily 
evaluate the benefit received. Consequently many tax authorities regard 
service fees as particularly prone to potential abuse and therefore devote 
increasing resources to auditing these transactions. 
The levels of service fees of tax responsible MNEs are usually justifiable in 
respect of the nature and quality of the services provided, after taking into 
account the tax implications of the transactions in all the affected 
jurisdictions.  It is expected from these tax responsible MNEs to consider 
and have a comprehensive approach to identify and evaluate cross border 
intra-group services and develop bespoke transfer pricing policies 
applicable to the group forming part of a specific MNE which meet the 
expectations of the various tax authorities in the jurisdictions in which they 
operate.   
It is generally accepted that two issues need to be considered in the 
transfer pricing analysis of cross-border intra-group services.103 104 The first 
issue is to determine whether or not a service has indeed been supplied 
and the second issue is to determine an arm’s length consideration for 
economical or commercially valued services received which consideration 
should be related to the benefit or value received.105 106 
                                               
 
103 OECD, note 55, para. 7.5, p. 206 
104 Some jurisdictions such as Brazil have adopted transfer pricing policies applicable to services which are 
inconsistent with the arm’s length principle.  These ad hoc rules cause significant issues for MNEs which apply 
global transfer pricing policies which are consistent with the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines.  MNEs operating 
in jurisdictions such as Brazil need to customise their global transfer pricing policies in order to align them with local 
rules in order to avoid or mitigate double taxation in respect of service fees. 
105 The United States of America has issued regulations under section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code which 
are also based on the same principles.  In terms of the regulations, an important initial examination in performing a 
transfer pricing analysis for services is determining for whose benefit an expense is incurred.  Where the expense 
was incurred for the benefit of more than one entity, the expense must be allocated. 
106 In Australia, Head Office services are chargeable if the activity related to the service conferred a benefit to a 
taxpayer.  The Australian tax Office further takes the view that where a benefit is provided to an entity by way of a 
service and there is a real connection between the entity’s operations and the associate, the entity would be 
expected to pay for the service. 
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Clearly if no service was supplied, or a service has been supplied but that 
service does not provide a respective group member with economic or 
commercial value to enhance its commercial position, i.e. an independent 
enterprise in comparable circumstances would not have been willing to pay 
for the activity if performed for it by an independent enterprise or would 
have performed the activity in-house for itself, then the service should not 
be considered as an intra-group service under the arm’s length principle.  
The objective here however is not only to determine the value of the 
services rendered but also how direct or remote the benefits derived are in 
relation to the intra-group services rendered but also the relative proximity 
of the benefit derived to the intra-group services.  No charge should be 
attributed if the benefit is so indirect or remote that an unrelated party would 
not have charged for similar services.107 
These situations could be regarded as “profit stripping” activities and 
attempts to prevent these practices are justified. Most tax jurisdictions are 
empowered to deal with profit stripping activities of this nature as the tax 
legislation would usually include remedies such as denying a deduction of 
excess expenditure for corporate tax purposes on the basis that it was not 
incurred for the purpose of trade108, levying interest and penalties on the 
entity paying the excessive management fees, amongst others. 
The absence of provisions similar to the ones noted above does not limit 
jurisdictions from challenging these “profit stripping” activities. Common-
law principles nullify some forms of tax evasion without the need to invoke 
statutory anti-avoidance provisions. Indeed, the first inquiry where a 
suspicion arises that a tax scheme is improper is whether it falls foul of 
common law principles, that is to say, whether it involved a sham109 or 
                                               
 
107 Mehta, N., Formulating an Intra-Group Management Fee Policy: An Analysis from a Transfer Pricing and 
International Tax Perspective, International Transfer Pricing Journal, IBFD, September/October 2005, para. 2.4.1., 
p. 255 
108 For example, section 23(g) of the Income Tax Act, No 58 of 1962 of South Africa specifically provides that 
expenditure cannot be claimed as a deduction to the extent it was not incurred for the purpose of trade.  Section 8-
1(1)(b) of the Income Tax Assessment Act, 1997 of Australia provides that only expenditure necessarily incurred in 
the carrying on of a business may be deducted.  Also see note 100 regarding the allocation of expenses in the 
United States of America where more than one entity benefits from a service rendered. 
109 The term “sham” was defined by Lord Wilberforce in WT Ramsay Ltd v IRC ([1982] AC 300) and Furniss v 
Dawson ([1984] AC 474 (HL), 2 WLR 226) as “to say that a document or transaction is a “sham” means that while 
professing to be one thing, it is in fact something different.”.  Diplock, LJ. said in Snook v London & West Riding 
Investments Ltd ([1967] 2 QB 786 at 802) “I apprehend that, if [“sham”] has any meaning in law, it means acts 
done or documents executed by the parties to the “sham” which are intended by them to give to third parties or to 
the court the appearance of creating between the parties legal rights and obligations different from the actual 
legal rights and obligations (if any) which the parties intend to create.”. Diplock LJ then went on to make the 
important point that for an act or document to be a sham “all the parties thereto must have a common intention 
that the acts or documents are not to create the legal rights and obligations which they give the appearance of 
creating”. In this regard, a contract may be a sham either in part or in whole. The suggestion is therefore that if 
one party does not know that the other party has no genuine intention to create the legal rights and obligations 
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disguised transaction. As always, the strength of the common law is that it 
finds expression in terms of broad principles whereas the reach of a statute 
is limited by the particular words in which it is couched.110  The OECD also 
addressed the issue of substance over form of intra-group transactions in 
its Transfer Pricing Guidelines.  It states that “(A) tax administration’s 
examination of a controlled transaction ordinarily should be based on the 
transaction actually undertaken by the associated enterprises as it has 
been structured by them, using the methods applied by the taxpayer insofar 
as these are consistent with the methods described in Chapter II. In other 
than exceptional cases, the tax administration should not disregard the 
actual transactions or substitute other transactions for them. Restructuring 
of legitimate business transactions would be a wholly arbitrary exercise the 
inequity of which could be compounded by double taxation created where 
the other tax administration does not share the same views as to how the 
transaction should be structured. 
However, there are two particular circumstances in which it may, 
exceptionally, be both appropriate and legitimate for a tax administration to 
consider disregarding the structure adopted by a taxpayer in entering into 
a controlled transaction. The first circumstance arises where the economic 
substance of a transaction differs from its form. In such a case the tax 
administration may disregard the parties’ characterisation of the 
transaction and re-characterise it in accordance with its substance. … The 
second circumstance arises where, while the form and substance of the 
transaction are the same, the arrangements made in relation to the 
transaction, viewed in their totality, differ from those which would have 
been adopted by independent enterprises behaving in a commercially 
rational manner and the actual structure practically impedes the tax 
administration from determining an appropriate transfer price.”111  
The reasons for not attacking these transactions in terms of the provisions 
noted above may be due to lack of expertise and resources.112 
                                               
 
ostensibly brought into being, their bilateral transaction cannot be categorized as a sham. That said, there have 
been decisions in the United Kingdom in which a document was held to be a sham where there was no such 
common intention, but one of the parties simply went along with the shamming party, neither knowing nor caring. 
110 De Koker, A.P. and Williams, R.C., Silke on South African Income Tax, Lexisnexis (November 2013), para. 19.3 
111 OECD, note 55, paras. 1.64 – 1.65, pp. 51 – 52   
112 Refer to annexure 7 which deals with the arm’s length principle and transfer pricing as well as the current status 
quo in developing countries 
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This paper does not deal with service fees which can be described as 
“profit stripping” activities, services that are not chargeable, being regarded 
as “non-beneficial”113 or sham transactions.114  It deals with activities 
performed for one or more group members by another group member 
which are of economic or commercial value to the respective independent 
enterprise and enhance their commercial position and competitiveness.  
These are activities which the independent enterprise would have been 
willing to pay for or perform for itself.115 This issue is considered to be by 
far the most important factor that determines whether a related party 
recipient would pay for an intra-group service and as such can justify a 
charge for the provision of intra-group services. 
The OECD also states in its Transfer Pricing Guidelines that “(T)he fact 
that a payment was made to an associated enterprise for purported 
services can be useful in determining whether services were in fact 
provided, but the mere description of a payment as, for example, 
“management fees” should not be expected to be treated as prima facie 
evidence that such services have been rendered. At the same time, the 
absence of payments or contractual agreements does not automatically 
lead to the conclusion that no intra-group services have been rendered.”116 
The OECD holds the view that arms’ length pricing is the only way to 
combat transfer pricing.  It claims that there is international consensus with 
this view although it has been said that this position has been deployed to 
thwart any debate about the matter elsewhere, specifically in the UN Tax 
Committee.117 
The application of the OECD Guidelines and the arms’ length principle has 
been challenged by the International Centre for Tax and Development 
(“ICTD”) in the context of developing countries as being “impossible to 
apply effectively or consistently, and demanding a very high level of 
                                               
 
113 These services would, in addition to shareholder activities, include duplicative services, services that provide 
incidental benefits, passive association benefits and on-call services. Also see OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 
Chapter VII: Intra-group services, OECD, note 55 
114 Sham transactions relates to the substance-over-form doctrine, i.e., transactions that are deemed to have been 
set-up solely to obtain tax benefits, transactions that lack meaningful economic benefits independent of tax benefits. 
115 The OECD states at para. 7.6 in its Transfer Pricing Guidelines that “(T)his can be determined by considering 
whether an independent enterprise in comparable circumstances would have been willing to pay for the activity if 
performed for it by an independent enterprise or would have performed the activity in-house for itself. If the activity 
is not one for which the independent enterprise would have been willing to pay or perform for itself, the activity 
ordinarily should not be considered as an intra-group service under the arm’s length principle.” 
116 OECD, note, 55, para. 7.18, p. 210 
117 Picciotto, S., Is the International Tax System Fit for Purpose, Especially for Developing Countries?, ICTD 
Working Paper 13, September 2013, ICTD, para. 2.6, p. 22 
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resources.”118 The European Commission also acknowledged that the 
application of the OECD Guidelines as, notwithstanding that all Member 
States (of the European Union) apply and recognise the merits of the 
OECD Guidelines, the different interpretations given to these guidelines 
often give rise to cross-border disputes which are detrimental to the smooth 
functioning of the Internal Market and which create additional costs for 
businesses and national tax administrations.119 
The United Nations Practical Manual on Transfer Pricing for Developing 
Countries (“UN Transfer Pricing Manual”) was released in 2013.  The 
guidelines offered in the UN Transfer Pricing Manual are consistent, 
although not identical, to the OECD Guidelines.  Some commentators are 
of the opinion that the UN Transfer Pricing Manual is not an alternative to 
the OECD Guidelines although it can evolve in that manner.120   
The “build-up” to the UN Transfer Pricing Manual included a number of 
sessions where certain aspects and challenges of transfer pricing in the 
developing world were discussed.  One such session was held in Geneva 
from 18 – 22 October 2010.  Mr Brian Arnold was tasked with the 
preparation of a note which was presented to the Committee of Experts on 
International Cooperation of Tax Matters.  The note dealt with “Taxation of 
Services under the United Nations Model Tax Convention”.121 
MNEs face a multitude of challenges and additional costs in preparing 
documentation to demonstrate that they are compliant with transfer pricing 
rules in all jurisdictions in which they operate especially as the expectations 
of jurisdictions grow and the documentary requirements and supporting 
evidence needed vary significantly between jurisdictions and quite often 
the amount and type of documentation required are disproportionate in 
                                               
 
118 Picciotto, S., note 117, para. 2.4, p. 17 
119 Euorpean Commissions, Transfer pricing in the EU context, See 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/company_tax/transfer_pricing/index_en.htm, accessed on 27 April 
2014. 
120 Hearson, M., The United Nations Practical Manual on Transfer Pricing: a bluffer’s guide, 6 June 2013, 
http://martinhearson.wordpress.com/2013/06/06/the-united-nations-practical-manual-on-transfer-pricing-a-
bluffers-guide/, accessed on 23 February 2014 
121 UN, note 57 
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relation to the service fees paid.122 123 124 Non-compliance with these 
requirements may result in the disallowance of the expense and an 
effective double tax charge on the same service fees, i.e. a withholding tax 
on services as well as an increase in taxable income as a consequence of 
the disallowance of the service fees expense incurred. 
Add to this the fact that transfer pricing, especially as regards intra-group 
services, is a controversial issue at present, MNEs need to also consider 
non-transfer pricing related issues when they evaluate any decision 
regarding transfer pricing against non-technical issues such as corporate 
reputation and public perception.125  
As some tax authorities perceive service fees to be “low-hanging fruit”, 
MNEs should give careful consideration to the documentation and other 
information which support the service fees charged.126  
Notwithstanding that intra-group services are one of the major focus areas 
of tax authorities, international bodies and MNEs worldwide, very little, if 
any, has been said or written of intra-group services in the context of 
                                               
 
122 The actual gathering of the information to prove compliance with deductibility requirements can pose a number 
of challenges for taxpayers.  Examples of evidentiary requirements include flight tickets, correspondence and 
reports by headquarter experts which demonstrate that services were provided as well as clear examples of how 
the services generated profits for the taxpayer.  However, as the assistance provided is in many cases of a 
fragmentary nature, for example a telephonic discussion between the a financial manager working in the group 
accounts department at the headquarter with the financial manager of the affiliate located in another jurisdiction, a 
multiparty conference call with an expert in the legal department or a four-hour assistance from engineers located 
at the headquarters when selecting a new supplier, collecting evidence or generating a file that extensively 
documents the benefits and relevance of the services rendered from aboard may be extremely difficult (if not 
impossible) and burdensome on the taxpayer, especially as such evidence is often widely dispersed across the 
organisation and even across various jurisdictions. In the case of some South American countries, documenting 
the benefits and nature of services received from foreign related parties is the first threshold that must be passed 
before documenting the basis for determination of the price paid for the services received. 
123 As regards the need for documentary evidence, the OECD states as follows in its guideline at para. 5.7: “…, the 
taxpayer should not be expected to incur disproportionately high costs and burdens to obtain documents from 
foreign associated enterprises or to engage in an exhaustive search for comparable data from uncontrolled 
transactions if the taxpayer reasonably believes, having regard to the principles of these Guidelines, either that no 
comparable data exists or that the cost of locating the comparable data would be disproportionately high relative to 
the amounts at issue. Tax administrations should also recognise that they can avail themselves of the exchange of 
information articles in bilateral double tax conventions to obtain such information, where it can be expected to be 
produced in a timely and efficient manner.”  It continues in para. 5.7: “Thus, while some of the documents that might 
reasonably be used or relied upon in determining arm’s length transfer pricing for tax purposes may be of the type 
that would not have been prepared or obtained other than for tax purposes, the taxpayer should be expected to 
have prepared or obtained such documents only if they are indispensable for a reasonable assessment of whether 
the transfer pricing satisfies the arm’s length principle and can be obtained or prepared by the taxpayer without a 
disproportionately high cost being incurred. The taxpayer should not be expected to have prepared or obtained 
documents beyond the minimum needed to make a reasonable assessment of whether it has complied with the 
arm’s length principle.”  
124 There are currently 58 jurisdictions which specify varied documentary requirements in their transfer pricing 
rule/regulations.  These are listed in annexure 8. 
125 pwc, International Transfer Pricing, 2013/14, pp. 4 – 5, http://www.pwc.com/internationaltp  
126 This is also evident from the excessive withholding tax rates levied by some jurisdictions on technical and 
management fees in comparison to their corporate tax rates as noted in annexure 3 and to the withholding tax on 
royalties rates in certain jurisdictions as noted in annexure 12. 
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withholding tax on services, the source of the services, transfer pricing 
principles as well as deductions of intra-group services or claiming of 
withholding tax credits or deductions.127  
6.2. Methods prescribed by the OECD 
The transfer pricing principles laid down in the OECD Guidelines are 
generally applied and have been adopted by the UN as well in its transfer 
pricing manual.128 It is therefore necessary to consider the transfer pricing 
principles applicable to intra-group services as determined in the OECD 
Guidelines.  The stated principles are: 
 The arm’s length price of intra-group services must be considered 
both from the perspective of the service provider and that of the 
recipient of the service.  The value of the service to the recipient and 
how much a comparable independent enterprise would be prepared to 
pay for that service in comparable circumstances, as well as the costs 
to the service provider, must be considered.129 
 The method to be used to determine arm’s length transfer pricing 
for intra-group services should be determined according to the 
OECD Guidelines. The preferred methods for intra-group services 
are the comparable uncontrolled price method (“CUP method”) or 
the cost plus method. The CUP method is regarded as the most 
appropriate method where there is a comparable service provided 
between independent enterprises in the recipient’s market, or by 
the associated enterprise providing the services to an independent 
enterprise in comparable circumstances. A cost-plus method is 
regarded as the most appropriate method in the absence of a CUP 
method price where the nature of the activities involved, assets 
used, and risks assumed are comparable to those undertaken by 
independent enterprises. Transactional profit methods may be 
used where they are the most appropriate to the circumstances of 
the case.  In exceptional cases, for example where it may be difficult 
                                               
 
127 The only publication which deals with some of these issues was published by pwc.  The publication is called 
“Double jeopardy …” and deals specifically with leading practices for managing double taxation risk in the oil and 
gas industry. This issue is however not unique to the oil and gas industry and applies to all types of multi-national 
business operations and industries. See  http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/tax/publications/transfer-
pricing/perspectives/taxrisk-oil-gas.jhtml, accessed on 30 April 2014 
128 Transfer pricing information often does not state explicitly that the OECD methods are applied but rather that a 
country uses the “arm’s length principle”.  Deviations, some limited and other more extreme, are also noted. There 
are a number of countries that do not apply these methods to services.  Details can be found in annexure 7. 
129 OECD, note 55, para. 7.29, p. 213 
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to apply the CUP method or the cost-plus method, it may be helpful 
to take account of more than one method in reaching a satisfactory 
determination of arm’s length pricing.130 
 It is important to consider whether the charge should result in a 
profit for the service provider. It is unlikely that an independent 
enterprise would provide services at cost without the expectation of 
realising a profit.  However, there are circumstances in which an 
independent enterprise may not realise a profit from the 
performance of service activities alone, for example where a 
supplier’s costs (anticipated or actual) exceed market price but the 
supplier agrees to provide the service to increase its profitability, 
perhaps by complementing its range of activities. Therefore, it need 
not always be the case that an arm’s length price will result in a 
profit for an associated enterprise that is performing an intra-group 
service.131 132 
6.3. Methods prescribed by the UN 
The UN Transfer Pricing Manual deals with intra-group services.  It loosely 
defines an intra-group service as “a service provided by one enterprise to 
another in the same MNE group. For a service to be considered an intra-
group service it must be similar to a service which an independent 
enterprise in comparable circumstances would be willing to pay for in-
house or else perform by itself. If not, the activity should not be considered 
as an intra-group service under the arm’s length principle.”133 It further 
states that the “rationale is that if specific group members do not need the 
activity and would not be willing to pay for it if they were independent, the 
activity cannot justify a payment. Further, any incidental benefit gained 
solely by being a member of an MNE group, without any specific services 
provided or performed, should be ignored.”134 
As is the case with the OECD Guidelines, the UN Transfer Pricing Manual 
gives preference to the determination of an arm’s length price for intra-
                                               
 
130 OECD, note 55, para. 7.31, p. 214 
131 OECD, note 55, para. 7.33, pp. 214 – 215   
132 Working Party No. 6 of the Committee of Fiscal Affairs of the OECD issued a document for public consultation, 
the “Revised Discussion Draft on Transfer Pricing aspects of Intangibles” on 30 July 2013.  A brief review of the 
findings of the working party can be found in annexure 1. 
133 UN, note 57, para. 1.6.8, p. 19 
134 UN, note 57, para. 1.6.8., p. 19 
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group services either directly by way of the CUP Method provided 
comparable services are available in the open market or, in the absence of 
comparable services, the Cost Plus Method or where a direct charge 
method is difficult to apply, an indirect charge method135 may be used such 
as cost sharing. The indirect charge methods would usually be accepted 
by the tax authorities only if the charges are supported by foreseeable 
benefits for the recipients of the services, the methods are based on sound 
accounting and commercial principles and they are capable of producing 
charges or allocations that are commensurate with the reasonably 
expected benefits to the recipient. In addition, tax authorities might allow a 
fixed charge on intra-group services under safe harbour rules or a 
presumptive taxation regime, for instance where it is not practical to 
calculate an arm’s length price for the performance of services and tax 
accordingly.136 
6.4. Methods prescribed by other institutions or jurisdictions 
The European Commission has also developed proposals on income 
allocation to members of MNEs active in the European Union (“EU”). Some 
of the approaches considered have included the possibility of a “common 
consolidated corporate tax base (CCTB)” and “home state taxation”.137 
Under both options transfer pricing would be replaced by formulary 
apportionment, whereby taxing rights would be allocated between 
countries based upon the apportionment of the European business activity 
of an MNE conducted in those countries. Apportionment would be under 
an agreed formula, based upon some indicia of business activity such as 
some combination of sales, payroll, and assets.  
A formulary apportionment approach is currently used by some states of 
the United States of America, cantons of Switzerland and provinces of 
Canada. The Brazilian and Kuwaiti transfer pricing rules specify a 
maximum ceiling on the expenses that may be deducted for tax purposes 
in respect of imports and sets a minimum level for the gross income in 
                                               
 
135 An “indirect charge method” is defined as “(A) method under which fees for intra-group services are computed 
on the basis of apportionment of costs using an allocation key, with an appropriate mark-up.”, UN, note 72, p. 484 
136 UN, note 57, paras. 1.6.9 – 1.6.10, pp. 19 - 20 
137 See http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/company_tax/common_tax_base/index_en.htm, accessed 
on 30 April 2014  
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relation to exports, effectively using a set formula to allocate income to their 
jurisdictions.138 
7. Practical application of transfer pricing methods to intra-group cross border 
service charges 
7.1. Percentage of sales 
The majority of tax authorities do not accept services fees which are 
charged as a percentage of sales.  There are also instances where 
exchange control regulations do not permit the remittance of fees such as 
management fees which are based on a percentage of sales, turnover, 
purchases, etc.139 
7.2. Comparable uncontrolled price method 
Whilst the CUP method is regarded as the preferred method for the 
determination of intra-group charges in general140 141, it is not regarded as 
a preferred method in the case of management services as the service 
provider does not generally provide similar services to independent third 
parties or unrelated parties, and the services provided are usually unique 
to the group.  This method requires a high degree of comparability in the 
services provided in the controlled and uncontrolled transactions. This level 
of comparability is extremely difficult to meet in practice.142 143  
However, there may be circumstances where comparable data may indeed 
be available for example where the MNE establishes its own banking, 
insurance, legal or financial services operations although great care must 
be exercised when the activities are compared with third party 
                                               
 
138 Also refer to annexure 7 for other methods applied by other jurisdictions 
139 The South African exchange control regulations prohibit the remittance of management fees which are based 
on a percentage of sales, turnover, purchases etc.  A detailed invoice specifying the services rendered and the 
basis for the fee must be submitted to the bankers of the remitting entity when payment is affected. An analysis of 
the exchange control requirements is not included in this paper. 
140 pwc, note 125, p. 82; OECD, note 51, para. 7.31, p. 214 
141 Mehta, N., note 107, para. 2.5.1.1., p. 261: While the OECD Guidelines provide that where it is possible to locate 
comparable uncontrolled transactions, the CUP method is the most direct and reliable way to apply the arms’ length 
principle.  However, it may be difficult to apply this method in practice for intra-group services because this method 
is ideally suited for commodities that are the subject of frequent trade in the open market.  However, for intra-group 
dealings in services, the difficulty that may arise is the absence of an open-market price for similar services. 
142 Mehta, N., note 107, para. 2.5.1.1., p. 261.   
143 The CUP method is defined in the UN Transfer Pricing Manual as “(A) transfer pricing method comparing the 
price of the property or service transferred in the controlled transaction with the price charged in comparable 
transactions in similar circumstances”, UN, note 72, p.482 
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businesses.144 This is due to the fact that third parties need to deal with the 
challenges of real market conditions whereas group companies are often 
obliged to use the services provided within the group. 
The CUP method is therefore not regarded as an appropriate method to 
determine an arm’s length price in the context of intra-group services.145  
7.3. Cost-plus method 
The cost-plus method146 is typically used in circumstances where services 
are rendered and no fee can be determined in terms of the CUP method.  
The costs incurred in providing the services must be analysed147 and where 
services are provided to various beneficiaries in the group, the costs must 
be charged on a pro-rata basis.148  With this method the gross mark-up149 
realised on a controlled transaction is compared with that of an 
uncontrolled transaction, i.e. the mark up achieved by the same supplier in 
a comparable dealing with an unconnected party.  This method is usually 
used where the recipient is exposed to limited economic risk in respect of 
the transaction.  This method is primarily dependent upon the similarity of 
the functions performed and the risks assumed by the controlled and 
uncontrolled service providers and less dependent on the similarity of the 
actual services rendered. 
One of the practical problems associated with this method is that it is 
usually difficult to find transactions between independent parties which are 
sufficiently similar to the controlled transactions.  The differences usually 
have a material impact on the price of the service and it is also difficult, if 
                                               
 
144 OECD, note 55, para. 2.15, p. 63 
145 Refer to annexure 7 for details of countries which prescribe the CUP method for intra-group cross border 
services 
146 The Cost Plus Method is defined in the UN Transfer Pricing Manual as “(T)he Cost Plus Method evaluates the 
arm’s length nature of an inter-company charge for tangible property or services by reference to the gross-mark up 
on costs incurred by the supplier of the property or services.  It compares the gross profit mark-up earned by the 
tested party with the gross mark-ups earned by comparable companies.”, UN, note 67, p.482.  Gross profit mark-
up is also commonly referred to as a profit margin. 
147 MNEs based in most OECD member nations put a great deal of effort into analysing the functions and services 
provided in order to determine an appropriate fee for them.  The tax authorities of developing countries however 
have focussed on the deductibility of the fee itself rather than the transfer pricing policy and the determination of 
the price charged. See pwc publication, South America: Dealing with local complexity when applying global transfer 
pricing policies, http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/tax/publications/transfer-pricing/perspectives/south-america-
tppolicies.jhtml, accessed on 30 April 2014   
148 A suitable basis for the allocation of the costs the various beneficiaries must be determined as this aspect is 
often challenged by tax authorities. 
149 The addition of a gross margin or gross mark-up to costs of sale will result in a gross profit being earned by the 
service provider.  Gross profit is generally defined as the “result of deducting from total sales the cost of sales, 
including all expenses directly incurred in relation to those sales.” 
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not impossible, to determine reasonable adjustments to eliminate the effect 
of these differences on the price.  
Determination of costs 
MNEs need to analyse the costs associated with rendering the services 
which is determined by using an acceptable cost-accounting system which 
is developed according to generally accepted accounting principles.  Most 
jurisdictions do not prescribe a specific cost-accounting method and will 
accept any suitable method provided the method is generally acceptable 
and applied consistently.  
It is recognised that this method presents some difficulties in the 
determination of costs particularly as, although it is accepted that an 
enterprise must cover its costs over a period of time to remain in business, 
those costs may not be determinant of the appropriate profit in a specific 
case for any one year. Examples would be situations where a valuable 
discovery is made but the costs in making the discovery were 
insignificant.150 
The full-cost basis can also be used to determine a suitable price provided 
it reflects all relevant costs – both direct and indirect costs.  It is usually not 
acceptable to compute the costs on an incremental basis. 
Direct costs are costs that are identifiable with the delivery of particular 
services, such as costs of employees directly engaged in performing the 
services and materials and supplies directly consumed in rendering the 
services.  
Indirect costs are costs that are not specifically identifiable in relation to the 
specific activities but is related to the direct costs.  These costs would 
include expenses such as office expenditure, telephone costs, supervisory 
services and clerical services and other overhead expenditure related to 
the department rendering the services. Indirect costs should be 
apportioned on a reasonable basis to the service rendered.151 
 
                                               
 
150 OECD, note 55, para. 2.43, p. 72 
151The United States of America requires the inclusion of stock-based compensation in the costs associated with 
a particular service. This inclusion is causing some controversy as transactions between third parties typically do 
not include these types of costs in their service costs and these costs are not considered in negotiations with third 
parties.  MNEs operating from the United States of America are obliged to comply with this requirement. 
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Addition of profit margin/gross mark-up 
Once the cost base has been identified and a basis for the allocation of 
service charges to various group companies is established, a mark-up, if 
any, needs to be determined.  Whilst most tax authorities expect intra-
group services will be charged based on the cost-plus method with an 
appropriate profit margin added to the costs determined, it should be noted 
that not all tax authorities allow the addition of a profit margin, especially if 
the profit margin is not adequately substantiated.  Issues may also arise in 
the jurisdiction from which the service is rendered if no profit margin is 
added to the costs determined.  
Most developed countries accept that a reasonable profit margin is 
acceptable although the economic alternatives available to the recipient of 
the service must also be taken into account in determining the profit 
margin, if any and it may well be that the price the recipient is willing to pay 
for the services does not exceed the cost of the supply of the service 
provider.   
If found that a profit margin on the services is appropriate, the profit margin 
must be determined with reference to comparable transactions.  In practice 
many tax authorities expect to see certain levels of profit margin as the 
norm, usually between 3% and 10%152 of costs in respect of services 
unless the services are a crucial element in the operations of the recipient.  
This situation usually occurs where the value of the services to the recipient 
substantially exceeds the costs of providing the services.  The profit margin 
on routine services where the value of the services does not exceed the 
costs of provision may be 0% or negligible. 
Another consideration is the treatment of the profit margin by the tax 
authorities of the jurisdiction in which the recipient operates as 
disallowance of the profit margin. For instance, on routine services, this 
may result in a denial of the deduction of the profit margin whilst the 
services provider is subject to tax on the full amount charged, i.e. it may 
result in economical double taxation on the profit margin. 
 
                                               
 
152 Some jurisdictions, such as India, may accept a profit margin range of between 5% and 20% of costs, depending 
on the nature of the services provided. Other, such as Brazil and Kuwait, will only accept a profit margin basis 
determined in terms of margins set by their tax authorities. 
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8. Is withholding tax on services a “cost”?  
Whilst it is clear that withholding tax on services is an economic cost to a business, it 
would seem that it is not regarded as a “cost” in the context of transfer pricing. 
No guidance is offered in the OECD Guidelines as, whilst it refers to costs in various 
contexts, it does not deal with withholding taxes in the context of costs. It states that 
“(W)hile precise accounting standards and terms may vary, in general the costs and 
expenses of an enterprise are understood to be divisible into three broad categories. 
First, there are the direct costs of producing a product or service, such as the cost 
of raw materials. Second, there are indirect costs of production, which although 
closely related to the production process may be common to several products or 
services (e.g. the costs of a repair department that services equipment used to 
produce different products). Finally, there are the operating expenses of the 
enterprise as a whole, such as supervisory, general, and administrative expenses. 
The distinction between gross and net profit analyses may be understood in the 
following terms. In general, the cost plus method will use mark ups computed after 
direct and indirect costs of production, while a net profit method will use profits 
computed after operating expenses of the enterprise as well. It must be recognised 
that because of the variations in practice among countries, it is difficult to draw any 
precise lines between the three categories described above. Thus, for example, an 
application of the cost plus method may in a particular case include the consideration 
of some expenses that might be considered operating expenses. Nevertheless, the 
problems in delineating with mathematical precision the boundaries of the three 
categories described above do not alter the basic practical distinction between the 
gross and net profit approaches.”153 (author’s emphasis).  
The UN Transfer Pricing Manual does not deal with costs in great detail but states 
that “(T)he costs and expenses of an entity normally fall into the following three 
groups: (1) direct cost of producing a product or service (e.g. cost of raw materials); 
(2) indirect costs of production (e.g. costs of a repair department that services 
equipment used to manufacture different products); and (3) operating expenses (e.g. 
SG&A expenses). The gross profit margin used in the Cost Plus Method is a profit 
                                               
 
153 OECD, note 55, paras. 2.47 – 2.48, pp. 73 – 74  
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margin that is calculated by subtracting only the direct and indirect costs of production 
from the sales price.” (author’s emphasis)154 
“Gross profit” is defined in the UN Transfer Pricing Manual as “(T)he result of 
deducting from total sales the cost of sales including all expenses directly incurred in 
relation to those sales.”155 
The term “direct cost” is defined in the OECD Guidelines as “costs that are incurred 
specifically for producing a product or rendering service, such as the cost of raw 
materials”156 and “indirect cost” is defined as “costs of producing a product or service 
which, although closely related to the production process, may be common to several 
products or services (for example, the costs of a repair department that services 
equipment used to produce different products”.157  The term “operating expenses” is not 
defined in the OECD Guidelines and is generally understood to refer to the on-going costs 
for running a product, business or system and relates to the day-to-day expenses 
such as sales and administration or research & development, as opposed to 
production, costs and pricing.158 
The UN approach suggests that “(D)ue to differences in accounting standards 
between countries, the boundaries between the three groups of costs and expenses 
are not the same in each and every case. Suitable adjustments may need to be 
made.”159  The UN therefore supports the view that the costs to be taken into account 
therefore need to be classified in terms of general accounting standards and 
principles. 
International Financial Reporting Standards (“IFRS”) set out recognition, 
measurement, presentation and disclosure requirements dealing with transactions 
and events that are important in general purpose financial statements. They may also 
set out such requirements for transactions and events that arise mainly in specific 
industries. IFRSs are based on the conceptual framework, which addresses the 
concepts underlying the information presented in general purpose financial 
statements.160 Accounting principles are generally based on these conceptual 
                                               
 
154 UN, note 57, para. 6.2.15.3, p. 218 
155 UN, note 57, p. 484 
156 OECD, Note 55, p. 26 
157 OECD, Note 55, p. 27 
158 Operating expenses include accounting expenses, license fees, maintenance and repairs, such as snow 
removal, trash removal, janitorial service, pest control, and lawn care, advertising, office expenses, supplies, 
attorney fees and legal fees, utilities, such as telephone, insurance, property management, including a resident 
manager, property taxes, travel and vehicle expenses, leasing commissions, salary and wages, etc. 
159 UN, note 57, para. 6.2.15.3, p. 218 
160 IFRs, 2014 Blue Book, Preface to International Reporting Standard, para. 8, 
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frameworks.  The conceptual frameworks are usually referred to as a IFRS or an 
International Accounting Standard (“IAS”) 
IAS 12 deals with “Income Taxes”. It states that “(F)or the purposes of this Standard, 
income taxes include all domestic and foreign taxes which are based on taxable 
profits. Income taxes also include taxes, such as withholding taxes, which are 
payable by a subsidiary, associate or joint arrangement on distributions to the 
reporting entity.”161 (author’s emphasis). 
Withholding taxes are therefore regarded as a payment on account of the recipient's 
final tax liability.  In the context of general accepted accounting practices, it cannot be 
regarded as direct costs, indirect costs or operating expenses and it would appear 
that it would be the case for purposes of transfer pricing as well. 
There are however instances where commentators have expressed the view that 
withholding taxes should be regarded as a cost for transfer pricing purposes.  WTS 
Alliance issued its Global Transfer Pricing Survey and Country Guide dealing with 
intra-group/management services in 2013.  It states that “(W)hen charging 
(management) service charges, also withholding taxes need to be taken into account. 
In about 50% of the countries withholding taxes are/could be due on the service 
charge, ranging from 0.6% to 25%. Experience learns that in practise the withholding 
taxes are not always taken into account appropriately between the service recipient 
and the service provider. (sic)”162 
The author has some difficulty with the suggestion that the withholding tax on services 
should be included in costs for transfer pricing purposes as, whilst neither the OECD 
Guidelines nor the UN Transfer Pricing Manual explicitly refer to the treatment of 
withholding taxes on services, reference is made on a number of occasions to 
“accounting principles” in the respective documents.163 164   
This position is different from that of so-called transaction taxes, such as value-added 
taxes, customs duties, sales taxes, service taxes, to name but a few.  These costs 
would normally be included in the determination of direct costs, indirect costs and 
even overheads where these transaction taxes were paid as part of the cost incurred 
in running the operations.  Transaction taxes are usually not regarded as “income 
                                               
 
http://eifrs.ifrs.org/eifrs/stdcontent/2014_Blue_Book/Preface_to_IFRS.html#ffon1, Accessed on 9 March 2014 
161 International Accounting Standard 12, Income Taxes, para. 2, 
http://eifrs.ifrs.org/eifrs/stdcontent/2014_Blue_Book/Preface_to_IFRS.html#ffon1, Accessed on 9 March 2014 
162 WTS Alliance, Global Transfer Pricing Survey and Country Guide, 2013, p. 7, http://www.wts-
alliance.com/en/img/TP_Survey_komplett.pdf, accessed 2 March 2014 
163 OECD, note 55, paras. 2.91, 7.23, 8.16 and 8.42. 
164 UN, note 57, paras. 5.3.4.18., 5.3.5.3., 5.3.5.4., 5.3.5.5., 6.2.7.2., 6.2.9.6., 6.2.15.2., 6.2.15.3. and 6.3.16.2. 
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taxes” and as such would require a different accounting treatment in terms of the 
generally accepted accounting practices applied across most jurisdictions.  
Based on the fact that both the OECD Guidelines and the UN Transfer Pricing Manual 
both support the application of accounting standards to determine costs and the fact 
that the accounting standards as stated in IAS 12 state that withholding tax is an 
income tax, and needs to be taken into account after the determination of “net profit 
before tax”, i.e. not as part of the costs to arrive at the “net profit before tax” results of 
an enterprise, the author is of the opinion that withholding tax cannot be taken into 
account as a cost to determine the transfer price of services rendered.   
It may well be that the withholding taxes could be taken into account when the profit 
margin that needs to be added to the costs is determined, but this is not entirely clear 
at this stage and will most likely not be acceptable in the jurisdictions concerned 
especially as the transfer pricing aspects of intra-group service fees are currently 
highly contentious.  The tax authorities of most jurisdictions apply the principles laid 
down in the OECD Guidelines or the UN Transfer Pricing Manual literally which do 
not support the inclusion of withholding taxes in the determination of costs.  It is 
unlikely that the gross-up of costs to take account of the withholding tax or any other 
form of inclusion of the withholding tax in the determination of costs for transfer pricing 
purposes will be accepted. 
This also appears to be the view and experience of a number of MNEs.  Some MNEs 
include a reference to the basis used to determine the service fees in the service fee 
agreements.  For example, the following types of provisions are often incorporated in 
the agreements: 
“The calculation of the Service Fees, including the cost computation method and cost 
allocation method used in this Agreement and the Mark-up are consistent with the 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. 
The Services Fees for the Services shall be calculated by adding (a) the Costs 
incurred by the Provider, which are attributable to the supply of the relevant Service(s) 
(calculated as set out below under Cost Computation Methodology), together with (b) 
the agreed Mark-up on the Non-Third Party Costs incurred by the Provider in 
providing the relevant Service(s).  
The Provider shall determine the sum of all direct and indirect Costs incurred in 
rendering the Services to the Recipients, including without limitation all cost of 
personnel, travel and equipment, all expenses paid to third parties and all overhead 
expenses in accordance with the accepted full cost accounting method determined in 
terms of General Accepted Accounting Principles.”  
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Other MNEs include a definition of “Costs” in their intra-group service agreements 
which often provide that Costs mean “the sum of full employment costs including 
payroll taxes of staff, travel costs and communication costs involved in providing 
shared resources as well as a proportion of overheads costs such as office costs. For 
management accounting purposes all these Costs are accounted for separately and 
the Costs are therefore easily identifiable.”  Provision is usually made for the addition 
of an arm’s length margin, usually as determined by way of a comparable search 
undertaken by a reputable external service provider, to be added to the Costs to arrive 
at the total fee. The margin is usually between 5% and 10%. 
9. Does withholding tax comprise a cost related to economic circumstances to be 
taken into account? 
The OECD Guidelines provide for a number of issues and circumstances that need 
to be considered in the determination of a reasonable transfer price.  One such 
consideration is the economic circumstances.  It provides as follows: 
“Arm’s length prices may vary across different markets even for transactions involving 
the same property or services; therefore, to achieve comparability requires that the 
markets in which the independent and associated enterprises operate do not have 
differences that have a material effect on price or that appropriate adjustments can 
be made. As a first step, it is essential to identify the relevant market or markets taking 
account of available substitute goods or services. Economic circumstances that may 
be relevant to determining market comparability include the geographic location; the 
size of the markets; the extent of competition in the markets and the relative 
competitive positions of the buyers and sellers; the availability (risk thereof) of 
substitute goods and services; the levels of supply and demand in the market as a 
whole and in particular regions, if relevant; consumer purchasing power; the nature 
and extent of government regulation of the market; costs of production, including the 
costs of land, labour, and capital; transport costs; the level of the market (e.g. retail 
or wholesale); the date and time of transactions; and so forth. The facts and 
circumstances of the particular case will determine whether differences in economic 
circumstances have a material effect on price and whether reasonably accurate 
adjustments can be made to eliminate the effects of such differences, …. 
The existence of a cycle (economic, business, or product cycle) is one of the 
economic circumstances that may affect comparability. …. 
The geographic market is another economic circumstance that can affect 
comparability. The identification of the relevant market is a factual question. For a 
number of industries, large regional markets encompassing more than one country 
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may prove to be reasonably homogeneous, while for others, differences among 
domestic markets (or even within domestic markets) are very significant.”165  
At first glance the application of economic circumstances seems to be limited to the 
microeconomic166 market conditions in the specific jurisdiction concerned and not the 
macroeconomic167 market conditions created as a result of fiscal policy applied in the 
jurisdiction concerned.  Such interpretation may result in withholding tax on services 
being disregarded when the economic circumstances are evaluated. 
The Inland Revenue Board of Malaysia issued Transfer Pricing Guidelines in which it 
states that “(E)conomic circumstances that may affect prices charged or profits 
earned in controlled and uncontrolled transactions include the geographic location of 
the market; the size of the market; the availability of substitute goods and services; 
the extent of government intervention e.g. whether goods compared are price 
controlled and the timing of the transactions.”168 
Examples of economic circumstances noted by the Pacific Association of Tax 
Administrators (“PATA”) include “the geographic location, market size, competitive 
environment, availability of substitute goods and services, levels of supply and 
demand, nature and extent of government regulations, and costs of production, 
etc.”169   
The reference to “extent of government intervention” and “extent of government 
regulations” in both extracts noted above, could be interpreted to allow for 
adjustments related to withholding tax on services as economic circumstance 
adjustments. 
As the cost-plus method is generally preferred to determine the transfer price for intra-
group services, any adjustment for the withholding tax on services would require an 
adjustment to the margin which should be added to the costs.  Further, as the 
withholding tax on services are usually levied on the gross amount paid, the adjusted 
transfer price could be calculated by calculating the “grossed-up” value of the service 
                                               
 
165 OECD, note 7, paras 1.55 – 1.57. pp. 48 - 49 
166 Microeconomics is defined as "the analysis of the decisions made by individuals and groups, the factors that 
affect those decisions, and how those decisions affect others". 
167 Macroeconomics is defined as "the branch of economics concerned with aggregates, such as national income, 
consumption, and investment ". 
168 Inland Revenue Board, Malaysia, Transfer Pricing Guidelines, para. 6.3.1, p. 7 
169 The Pacific Association of Tax Administrators (PATA), Transfer Pricing Documentation Package, Comparability, 
functional and risk analysis, pp. 6 - 7 
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determined using the cost-plus method before adjusting for the withholding tax on 
services.  
10. Effectiveness of current transfer pricing principles 
It is clear from the above that the current transfer pricing principles and practices do 
not deal adequately with situations where withholding taxes are levied on intra-group 
cross border services.  This is particularly relevant where there is a source v source 
conflict present between the jurisdiction from which the services are rendered and the 
jurisdiction which benefitted from the services rendered.  The situation is further 
exacerbated in situations where MNEs apply group transfer pricing policies – which 
are consistent with the principles applied in the majority of jurisdictions – in order to 
ensure consistency throughout the group and these policies are in conflict with the 
approach adopted by a handful of jurisdictions in which they operate for example 
Brazil, Kuwait and Canada, which will require a country-specific policy for those 
jurisdictions, and the Philippines, which require that the policy must be consistently 
applied on a world-wide basis notwithstanding jurisdictions which may apply other 
principles.   
11. Deduction of service fees 
Globally there are currently two possible treatments of deductions for service fees. 
The tax legislation of most developed countries generally allows for the deduction of 
services fees provided they meet the general requirements for deductions as provided 
in the legislation and the arm’s length principle, where applicable.  There is however 
a trend amongst a large number of the developing countries that either do not allow 
deductions for such service fees or only allow for limited deductions.170  
Some of the tax authorities have asserted that the disallowance of the service charge 
expense is a domestic issue and will not engage in any discussion related to this 
matter.  It is also not uncommon for jurisdictions to deny the deduction of the service 
fees on the basis that the domestic substantive and form requirements are not met.171 
Others, such as the countries forming part of the Commonwealth of Independent 
States172 will deny a deduction of cross border intra-group services if no invoices were 
                                               
 
170 Examples include countries such as Turkey, Korea, Mexico, Spain and Ghana. Also refer to annexure 9 for 
further details. 
171 A report issued  by pwc, Double jeopardy …, which deals with the managing of double taxation risk in the oil 
and gas industry, has noted that this practice is often followed in Mexico. 
http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/tax/publications/transfer-pricing/perspectives/taxrisk-oil-gas.jhtml, accessed on 
30 April 2014  
172 The members of the Commonwealth of Independent (“CIS”) states are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.  Turkmenistan and Ukraine participate in 
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produced and actual cash settlement took place, i.e. offsetting journals or accounting 
cross charges are not allowed. Albania, Latvia, Malaysia, Trinidad and Tobago and 
Venezuela only allow a deduction if the withholding tax on services have been 
withheld and remitted to the tax authority.173 
12. Acceptable margins on services per transfer pricing rules vs withholding tax 
on services174 
MNEs are facing major challenges in the current environment.  If one accepts that 
withholding tax on services was introduced as the only anti-avoidance measure 
against profit shifting, then the rates determined for withholding tax on services which 
are equal to or exceed the corporate tax rates of the countries concerned in the 
majority of cases makes sense.   
It is generally accepted that reasonable margins for services rendered vary between 
3% and 10% for standard services whereas specialist services command margins of 
up to 20% of costs using the cost plus method.175 
However, if one accepts that transfer pricing legislation and the enforcement of arm’s 
length pricing principles for intra-group cross border fees are the only effective 
measures to prevent profit-shifting, then the current withholding tax rates on services, 
set at the same level or more than the corporate tax rates as well as withholding tax 
on royalties rates, are out of line and do not take into account any expenditure incurred 
by the service provider.  The effect is no different had the countries concerned merely 
introduced legislation which denies any deduction of intra-group cross border service 
fees.176 
13. Tax credits or deductions for withholding taxes paid 
Income tax systems that tax residents on worldwide income, generally offer a foreign 
tax credit to mitigate the potential for double taxation. The credit may also be granted 
in those systems taxing residents on income that may have been taxed in another 
jurisdiction. The credit generally applies only to taxes of a nature similar to the tax 
being reduced by the credit, i.e. taxes based on income. This credit is often limited to 
                                               
 
the CIS although they are not member-states. Source: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commonwealth_of_Independent_States  
173 Details of the effective overall tax rate applicable to MNEs where withholding tax on services are levied in 
circumstances where deductions of the expenses are also disallowed can be found in annexure 9. 
174 Also see annexure 10 for a brief note on gross-up practices. 
175 Examples of acceptable ranges are 5% - 10% in Austria, 3% - 10% in Belgium, 3% - 8% in Bulgaria, 6% - 10% 
in France and 5% - 10% in Germany. 
176 See annexure 11 for examples of hypothetical group situations 
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the amount of tax attributable to foreign source income. Most income tax systems 
therefore contain rules defining source of income (domestic, foreign, or by country) 
and timing of recognition of income, deductions, and taxes, as well as rules for 
associating deductions with income.  
Tax treaties usually provide for relief from double taxation by way of an exemption 
from tax or a tax credit. These provisions apply in respect of taxes levied by other 
jurisdictions in terms of tax treaties but does not extend to taxes levied not dealt with 
in the tax treaties or in contradiction of the terms of the tax treaties.   
Countries such as Finland, Japan and Mauritius have also incorporated tax sparing 
provisions in their legislation which have limited application in specific circumstances.  
Tax sparing provisions are often used to encourage FDI. 
14. Does the current status quo yield equitable results? 
It is clear that the current status quo in the context of transfer pricing rules and its 
application to intra-group services does not yield equitable results in the context of 
international tax law.  Sol Picciotto attributes part of the lack of possible success in 
the resolution to this situation to the lack of clear rules to apply the transfer pricing 
guidelines.177 
Arnold acknowledges that the results from the imposition of a flat rate withholding tax 
on services on the basis that the income is from a source in the country making the 
payment in terms of article 21(3) of the UN Model DTA, is difficult to justify where the 
non-resident carries on a business in the source country as the fundamental scheme 
of the UN Model DTA is that business profits from services are taxable by the source 
country only if the non-resident has a permanent establishment or fixed base in the 
source country.  Otherwise the profits are taxable exclusively by the residence 
country.  Allowing unlimited source country taxation of fees or technical services as 
other income under article 21 is inappropriate.  He acknowledges that earning fees 
from the performance of technical services involves significant expenses and 
suggests that any source country tax should be imposed on a net basis or should be 
limited if imposed on the gross amount of payments.178 
The levying of withholding taxes on services together with the disallowance of 
deductions for these payments further exacerbates the situation.179  Add to that the 
                                               
 
177 Picciotto, S., note 117, para. 2.4, p. 17 
178 UN, note 41, para. 90, p. 28 
179 See annexure 9 for details of countries which levy withholding tax on services and may deny a deduction in the 
hands of the recipient of the services as well as an analysis of the impact of these practices on MNEs. 
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fact that most jurisdictions will only grant foreign tax credits in respect of foreign 
income included in the taxable income of the taxpayer concerned and will not grant a 
foreign tax credit paid on income from services where the withholding tax on services 
is levied either in contravention of a treaty or where the jurisdiction concerned regards 
the income from services not to be foreign income, then the situation is even worse 
and most definitely not equitable. 
15. Conclusion 
A withholding tax on services based on the gross amount payable to the non-resident 
service provider without taking into account the costs incurred by the non-resident 
service provider or within one or more of the entities forming part of an MNE is a rather 
punitive measure if its primary objective is the prevention of base erosion.180 
Whatever the solution to this rather untenable situation, businesses like simple, easy 
to apply principles upon which to rely. Therefore, it is hoped that the various interested 
parties will be able to balance the needs of the source-country with an option that 
businesses can easily employ. An option that is too difficult or cumbersome to apply 
may only serve as a barrier to compliance and attraction of FDI. 
What is clear is that sanity must prevail and that both an equitable and workable 
solution needs to be found to resolve the negative financial effects the current 
withholding tax on services has, as it is becoming a deterrent for much needed FDI in 
developing countries.  This solution should be sought at a global level yet be 
acceptable at a domestic level and be enforceable not only at a domestic level but 
globally as well.  Another issue that needs to be settled is which organisation will 
oversee the process, now and in the future, to ensure that just and equitable allocation 
of taxes are achieved and maintained. Put differently, given the magnitude of the 
global trade in services it is imperative that tax authorities ensure that trade in services 
is taxed efficiently, effectively and equitably.181 
In fact, transfer pricing is not as much about a tension between developed and 
developing countries, as about a tension between high tax and low tax jurisdictions. 
Many OECD and non-OECD countries suffer in the same way from the artificial 
                                               
 
180 If one accepts that a reasonable margin on cross-border intra-group services is 5% and that the country of 
residence of the payee is entitled to tax the service fee by way of a withholding tax, then a reasonable rate of 
withholding tax should not exceed 5% of the ruling corporate tax rate payable in the country of residence of the 
payee.  Equally, the country of residence of the recipient entity should then also allow the recipient entity to claim a 
tax credit.  The author however, acknowledges that this approach is simplistic and that it ignores the complexities 
associated with transactions of this nature and as such will not be an equitable and acceptable solution to the 
situation. 
181 United Nations Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters, Ninth session, Geneva, 
21 – 25 October 2013, Taxation of services – including provision on taxation of fees for technical services, 
E/C.18/2013/CRP.16, p. 4 
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shifting of profits to low tax jurisdictions. The arm’s length principle as applied in the 
OECD Guidelines and the UN Transfer Pricing Manual, were developed to establish 
a principled way to resolve disputes that arise among OECD countries related to the 
allocation of taxing rights over MNE profits. Developing and transitioning economies 
that are faced with the challenge of measuring the profits from MNEs that should be 
taxable in their jurisdiction can benefit from the arm’s length principle and OECD 
Guidelines in the same way as OECD countries have.182  
All the issues noted here are creating barriers to establishing service agreements 
where needed, much to the detriment of the affected entities and even possible future 
FDI in certain jurisdictions.  As stated by Kevin Holmes, “(A) country should not set 
its tax rates, including its non-resident withholding tax rates, applicable to foreign 
investors at a level so high as to deter foreign investment in the country to distort the 
cost of the capital structure in the country’s economy.”183  It is suggested that the 
OECD has not included withholding taxes as one of its recommendations to curtail 
so-called BEPS transactions as a reflection of its continuing discomfort with such 
taxes.184 
The development of effective operating structures which serves the unique needs of 
MNEs is costly and is usually put in place after the inherent costs and benefits have 
been evaluated. The responsible MNEs have taken great care to ensure these 
structures are robust from a commercial perspective should these be challenged.  The 
introduction of withholding tax on services, often at excessive rates, differing source 
rules and varied transfer pricing methods applied serves to frustrate and increase the 
complexity of normal and very basic commercial transactions within MNEs. The 
question is: Has the introduction of withholding tax on services resulted in a situation 
where responsible MNEs are now forced to allow “the tax tail to wag the business 
dog” in finding equitable solutions to this rather untenable situation? 
 
  
                                               
 
182 Transfer Pricing Legislation – A Suggested Approach, OECD, June 2011, p.3 
183 Holmes, K., note 69, p.9 
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Working Party No. 6 of the Committee on Fiscal Affairs of the OECD 
The OECD recognised in its report on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (“BEPS”) “that individual 
companies operating within Multi-National Enterprises (“MNEs”) undertake their activities 
within a framework of group policies and strategies which are set by the group as a whole.  
The separate legal entities forming part of the group therefore operates as a single integrated 
enterprise following an overall business strategy.  Management person may therefore be 
geographically dispersed rather than located in a single central location with reporting lines 
and decisions making processes going beyond the legal structure of the MNE.”185   
Working Party No. 6 of the Committee of Fiscal Affairs of the OECD is tasked with dealing with 
the transfer pricing aspects of intangibles, amongst others. It issued a document for public 
consultation, the “Revised Discussion Draft on Transfer Pricing aspects of Intangibles” on 
30 July 2013.  A number of amendments to the current OECD Guidelines are recommended 
such as amendments dealing with 
 Location savings and other local market features; 
 Assembled workforce; and 
 MNE Group Synergies. 
It states that “comparability issues can arise in connection with the consideration of local 
market advantages or disadvantages that may not be directly related to location savings”.186  
When dealing with other local market features it states that “(F)eatures of the local market in 
which business operations occur may affect the arm’s length price with respect to transactions 
between associated enterprises. While some such features may give rise to location savings, 
others may give rise to comparability concerns not directly related to cost savings. …. Similarly, 
the comparability and functional analysis conducted in connection with a particular matter may 
suggest that the relative availability of local country infrastructure, the relative availability of a 
pool of trained or educated workers, proximity to profitable markets, and similar features in a 
geographic market where business operations occur create market advantages or 
disadvantages that should be taken into account. Appropriate comparability adjustments 
                                               
 
185 Van den Brekel, R., Global: Transfer pricing and the OECD project on BEPS, International Tax Review, 12 June 
2013 
186 OECD, Public Consultation: Revised Discussion Draft on Transfer Pricing Aspects of Intangibles, 30 July 2013, 
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should be made to account for such factors where reliable adjustments that will improve 
comparability can be identified.”187    
It deals with intra-group services under the heading “MNE Group Synergies” and states the 
following: 
“Comparability issues, and the need for comparability adjustments, can also arise because of 
the existence of MNE group synergies. In some circumstances, MNE groups and the 
associated enterprises that comprise such groups may benefit from interactions or synergies 
amongst group members that would not generally be available to similarly situated 
independent enterprises. …. Such group synergies are often favourable to the group as a 
whole and therefore may heighten the aggregate profits earned by group members, depending 
on whether expected cost savings are, in fact, realised, and on competitive conditions. In other 
circumstances such synergies may be negative, as when the size and scope of corporate 
operations create bureaucratic barriers not faced by smaller and more nimble enterprises, or 
when one portion of the business is forced to work with computer or communication systems 
that are not the most efficient for its business because of group wide standards established by 
the MNE group.”188 189 
 
                                               
 
187 OECD, note 186, para. 6, p. 6 
188 OECD, note 186, para. 18, p. 8 
189 Various responses were received, most of them welcoming the initiative undertaken but also raising concerns 
that issues related to MNE group synergies have not be adequately addressed. (Conclusion reached from having 
read the response documents prepared by International Tax Center Leiden, KPMG International, Ernst & Young 















World map – countries which levy withholding tax on technical fees Annexure 2(2) 
Note – the world map is a visual representation only and should not be used for interpretative purposes. 





World map – countries which levy withholding tax on management fees Annexure 2(3) 
Note – the world map is a visual representation only and should not be used for interpretative purposes. 
The different colours indicate the variances in rates at which the withholding tax on management fees are levied. 
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World map – basis for levying withholding tax on technical fees Annexure 2(4) 
Note – the world map is a visual representation only and should not be used for interpretative purposes. 





World map – basis for levying withholding tax on management fees Annexure 2(5) 
Note – the world map is a visual representation only and should not be used for interpretative purposes. 





World map – explicit treaty relief noted in documentation Annexure 2(6) 
 
Note – the world map is a visual representation only and should not be used for interpretative purposes. 
Green – Treaty relief recognised; 





Comparison of corporate tax rates to withholding tax rates on technical fees and management 
or service fees 
 
Information sorted from highest percentage to lowest in respect of technical services 
 
 
      
      
 Corporate Withholding tax rate Withholding tax rate 
Country Tax   as % of 
 rate   corporate tax rate 
  Technical Management   
    Technical Management 
      
Republic of Uzbekistan 8% 20% 20% 250% 250% 
Turkmenistan 8% 15% 15% 188% 188% 
Republic of Serbia 15% 25% 25% 167% 167% 
Paraguay 10% 15% 15% 150% 150% 
Puerto Rico 20% 29% 29% 145% 145% 
Jamaica 25% 33.3% 33.3% 133% 133% 
Greece 20% 25% 25% 125% 125% 
Israel 25% 30% 25% 120% 100% 
Taiwan 17% 20% 20% 118% 118% 
Portugal 23% 25% 25% 109% 109% 
Poland 19% 20% 20% 105% 105% 
Andorra 10% 10% 10% 100% 100% 
Antiqua and Barbuda 25% 25% 25% 100% 100% 
Argentina 35% 35% 35% 100% 100% 
Belize 25% 25% 25% 100% 100% 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 10% 10% 10% 100% 100% 
Brunei Darussalam 20% 20% 20% 100% 100% 
Bulgaria 10% 10% 10% 100% 100% 
Ecuador 22% 22% 22% 100% 100% 
France 33.3% 33.3% 33.3% 100% 100% 
French Guiana 33.3% 33.3% 33.3% 100% 100% 
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 Corporate Withholding tax rate Withholding tax rate 
Country Tax   as % of 
 rate   corporate tax rate 
      
  Technical Management Technical Management 
      
Guadeloupe 33.3% 33.3% N/A 100% N/A 
Honduras 25% 25% 25% 100% 100% 
Kazakhstan 20% 20% 20% 100% 100% 
Kuwait 15% 15% 15% 100% 100% 
Kyrgyzstan 10% 10% 10% 100% 100% 
Macedonia 10% 10% 10% 100% 100% 
Martinique 33.3% 33.3% N/A 100% N/A 
Mauritania 25% 25% N/A 100% N/A 
Republic of Montenegro 9% 9% 9% 100% 100% 
Montserrat 20% 20% 20% 100% 100% 
Peru 30% 30% 30% 100% 100% 
Romania 16% 16% 16% 100% 100% 
Singapore 17% 17% 17% 100% 100% 
Sudan 15% 15% 15% 100% 100% 
Timor-Leste 10% 10% 10% 100% 100% 
Turkey 20% 20% 20% 100% 100% 
Dominican Republic 29% 28% 28% 97% 97% 
Algeria 25% 24% 24% 96% 96% 
Republic of Korea (South Korea) 22% 20% 20% 91% 91% 
San Marino 17% 15% 15% 88% 88% 
Slovenia 17% 15% 15% 88% 88% 
Slovak Republic 22% 19% 19% 86% 86% 
Kiribati 35% 30% 30% 86% 86% 
United States of America 35% 30% 30% 86% 86% 
Belarus 18% 15% 15% 83% 83% 
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 Corporate Withholding tax rate Withholding tax rate 
Country Tax   as % of 
 rate   corporate tax rate 
      
  Technical Management Technical Management 
      
Chad 30% 25% 20% 83% 67% 
Costa Rica 30% 25% 25% 83% 83% 
India 30% 25% 25% 83% 83% 
Mexico 30% 25% 25% 83% 83% 
The Sultanate of Oman 12% 10% 10% 83% 83% 
Philippines 30% 25% 25% 83% 83% 
Ukraine 18% 15% 15% 83% 83% 
Spain 30% 24.75% 24.75% 83% 83% 
Austria 25% 20% N/A 80% N/A 
Cape Verde 25% 20% 20% 80% 80% 
People's Republic of China 25% 20% 20% 80% 80% 
Egypt 25% 20% N/A 80% N/A 
Indonesia 25% 20% 20% 80% 80% 
Ivory Coast 25% 20% 20% 80% 80% 
Democratic People's Republic of 
Korea (North Korea) 25% 20% 20% 80% 80% 
Mongolia 25% 20% 20% 80% 80% 
Sao Tome and Principe 25% 20% 20% 80% 80% 
Czech Republic 19% 15% 15% 79% 79% 
Japan 25.5% 20% 0% 78% 0% 
Republic of Namibia 33% 25% 25% 76% 76% 
St Lucia 33.33% 25% 25% 75% 75% 
Chile 20% 15% 15% 75% 75% 
Cook Islands 20% 15% 15% 75% 75% 
Croatia 20% 15% 15% 75% 75% 
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 Corporate Withholding tax rate Withholding tax rate 
Country Tax   as % of 
 rate   corporate tax rate 
      
  Technical Management Technical Management 
      
Thailand 20% 15% 15% 75% 75% 
Burkina Faso 27.5% 20% 20% 73% 73% 
Canada 28% 20% 20% 71% 71% 
Cambodia 20% 14% 14% 70% 70% 
American Samoa 44% 30% 30% 68% 68% 
Botswana 22% 15% 15% 68% 68% 
Albania 15% 10% 10% 67% 67% 
El Salvador 30% 20% 20% 67% 67% 
Kenya 30% 20% 20% 67% 67% 
Latvia 15% 10% 10% 67% 67% 
Maldives 15% 10% 10% 67% 67% 
Senegal 30% 20% 20% 67% 67% 
Mozambique 32% 20% 20% 63% 63% 
St Vincent and the Grenadines 32.5% 20% 20% 62% 62% 
Republic of Congo 33% 20% 20% 61% 61% 
Barbados 25% 15% 15% 60% 60% 
Ghana 25% 15% 15% 60% 60% 
Liberia 25% 15% 15% 60% 60% 
Moldova 20% 12% 12% 60% 60% 
Nepal 25% 15% 15% 60% 60% 
Tajikistan 25% 15% 15% 60% 60% 
Tonga 25% 15% 15% 60% 60% 
Trinidad and Tobago 25% 15% 15% 60% 60% 
Zimbabwe 25% 15% 15% 60% 60% 
Zambia 35% 20% 20% 57% 57% 
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 Corporate Withholding tax rate Withholding tax rate 
Country Tax   as % of 
 rate   corporate tax rate 
      
  Technical Management Technical Management 
      
Swaziland 27.5% 15% 15% 55% 55% 
Fiji 28% 15% 15% 54% 54% 
Guatemala 28% 15% 15% 54% 54% 
Republic of South Africa 28% 15% 15% 54% 54% 
Niger 30% 16% 16% 53% 53% 
Togo 29% 15% 15% 52% 52% 
Armenia 20% 10% 10% 50% 50% 
Azerbaijan 20% 10% 10% 50% 50% 
Bolivia 25% 12.5% 12.5% 50% 50% 
Burundi 30% 15% 15% 50% 50% 
Central Africa Republic 40% 20% 20% 50% 50% 
Commonwealth of Dominica 30% 15% 15% 50% 50% 
Gambia 30% 15% 15% 50% 50% 
Guyana 40% 20% 20% 50% 50% 
Jordan 14% 7% 7% 50% 50% 
Lebanon 15% 7.5% 7.5% 50% 50% 
Madagascar 20% 10% 10% 50% 50% 
Malawi 30% 15% 15% 50% 50% 
Mali 30% 15% 15% 50% 50% 
Nicaragua 30% 15% 15% 50% 50% 
Palestinian Autonomous Areas 20% 10% 10% 50% 50% 
Panama 25% 12.5% 12.5% 50% 50% 
Qatar 10% 5% 7% 50% 70% 
Rwanda 30% 15% 15% 50% 50% 
Seychelles 30% 15% 15% 50% 50% 
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 Corporate Withholding tax rate Withholding tax rate 
Country Tax   as % of 
 rate   corporate tax rate 
      
  Technical Management Technical Management 
      
Tanzania 30% 15% 15% 50% 50% 
Tunisia 30% 15% 15% 50% 50% 
Uganda 30% 15% 15% 50% 50% 
Venezuela 34% 17% 34% 50% 100% 
Yemen 20% 10% 10% 50% 50% 
Uruguay 25% 12% 12% 48% 48% 
Estonia 21% 10% 10% 48% 48% 
Brazil 34% 15% 25% 44% 74% 
Pakistan 34% 15% 15% 44% 44% 
Guinea 35% 15% 15% 43% 43% 
Democratic Republic of Congo 35% 14% 14% 40% 40% 
Benin 30% 12% 12% 40% 40% 
Colombia 25% 10% 10% 40% 40% 
Djibouti 25% 10% 10% 40% 40% 
Guinea-Bissau 25% 10% N/A 40% N/A 
Lesotho 25% 10% 25% 40% 100% 
Malaysia 25% 10% 10% 40% 40% 
Papua New Guinea 30% 12% 17% 40% 57% 
Vietnam 25% 10% 5% 40% 20% 
Cameroon 38.5% 15% 15% 39% 39% 
Bangladesh 27.5% 10% 10% 36% 36% 
Ethiopia 30% 10% 10% 33% 33% 
Gabon 30% 10% 10% 33% 33% 
Georgia 30% 10% 15% 33% 50% 
Morocco 30% 10% 10% 33% 33% 
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 Corporate Withholding tax rate Withholding tax rate 
Country Tax   as % of 
 rate   corporate tax rate 
      
  Technical Management Technical Management 
      
Nigeria 30% 10% 10% 33% 33% 
St Kitts and Nevis 33% 10% 10% 30% 30% 
Kosovo 10% 3% 3% 30% 30% 
Eritrea 34% 10% 10% 29% 29% 
Comoros Islands 35% 10% 10% 29% 29% 
Equatorial Guinea 35% 10% 10% 29% 29% 
US Virgin Islands 35% 10% 10% 29% 29% 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 20% 5% 20% 25% 100% 
Solomon Islands 30% 7.5% 35% 25% 117% 
Sri Lanka 28% 5% 5% 18% 18% 
Angola 35% 5.25% 5.25% 15% 15% 
Myanmar 25% 3.5% 3.5% 14% 14% 
Iran 25% 3% 3% 12% 12% 
Cuba 35% 4% 4% 11% 11% 
Syria 28% 3% 3% 11% 11% 
Bhutan 30% 3% 3% 10% 10% 






Comparison of corporate tax rates to withholding tax rates on technical fees and management 
or service fees 
 
Information sorted from highest percentage to lowest in respect of management services 
 
      
      
 Corporate Withholding tax rate Withholding tax rate  
Country Tax   as % of  
 rate   corporate tax rate 
  Technical Management   
    Technical Management 
Republic of Uzbekistan 8% 20% 20% 250% 250% 
Turkmenistan 8% 15% 15% 188% 188% 
Republic of Serbia 15% 25% 25% 167% 167% 
Paraguay 10% 15% 15% 150% 150% 
Puerto Rico 20% 29% 29% 145% 145% 
Jamaica 25% 33.3% 33.3% 133% 133% 
Greece 20% 25% 25% 125% 125% 
Taiwan 17% 20% 20% 118% 118% 
Solomon Islands 30% 7.5% 35% 25% 117% 
Portugal 23% 25% 25% 109% 109% 
Poland 19% 20% 20% 105% 105% 
Andorra 10% 10% 10% 100% 100% 
Antiqua and Barbuda 25% 25% 25% 100% 100% 
Argentina 35% 35% 35% 100% 100% 
Belize 25% 25% 25% 100% 100% 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 10% 10% 10% 100% 100% 
Brunei Darussalam 20% 20% 20% 100% 100% 
Bulgaria 10% 10% 10% 100% 100% 
Ecuador 22% 22% 22% 100% 100% 
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 Corporate Withholding tax rate Withholding tax rate  
Country Tax   as % of  
 rate   corporate tax rate 
  Technical Management   
    Technical Management 
France 33.3% 33.3% 33.3% 100% 100% 
French Guiana 33.3% 33.3% 33.3% 100% 100% 
Honduras 25% 25% 25% 100% 100% 
Israel 25% 30% 25% 120% 100% 
Kazakhstan 20% 20% 20% 100% 100% 
Kuwait 15% 15% 15% 100% 100% 
Kyrgyzstan 10% 10% 10% 100% 100% 
Lesotho 25% 10% 25% 40% 100% 
Macedonia 10% 10% 10% 100% 100% 
Republic of Montenegro 9% 9% 9% 100% 100% 
Montserrat 20% 20% 20% 100% 100% 
Peru 30% 30% 30% 100% 100% 
Romania 16% 16% 16% 100% 100% 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 20% 5% 20% 25% 100% 
Singapore 17% 17% 17% 100% 100% 
Sudan 15% 15% 15% 100% 100% 
Timor-Leste 10% 10% 10% 100% 100% 
Turkey 20% 20% 20% 100% 100% 
Venezuela 34% 17% 34% 50% 100% 
Dominican Republic 29% 28% 28% 97% 97% 
Algeria 25% 24% 24% 96% 96% 
Republic of Korea (South Korea) 22% 20% 20% 91% 91% 
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 Corporate Withholding tax rate Withholding tax rate  
Country Tax   as % of  
 rate   corporate tax rate 
  Technical Management   
    Technical Management 
      
San Marino 17% 15% 15% 88% 88% 
Slovenia 17% 15% 15% 88% 88% 
Slovak Republic 22% 19% 19% 86% 86% 
Kiribati 35% 30% 30% 86% 86% 
United States of America 35% 30% 30% 86% 86% 
Belarus 18% 15% 15% 83% 83% 
Costa Rica 30% 25% 25% 83% 83% 
India 30% 25% 25% 83% 83% 
Mexico 30% 25% 25% 83% 83% 
The Sultanate of Oman 12% 10% 10% 83% 83% 
Philippines 30% 25% 25% 83% 83% 
Ukraine 18% 15% 15% 83% 83% 
Spain 30% 24.75% 24.75% 83% 83% 
Cape Verde 25% 20% 20% 80% 80% 
People's Republic of China 25% 20% 20% 80% 80% 
Indonesia 25% 20% 20% 80% 80% 
Ivory Coast 25% 20% 20% 80% 80% 
Democratic People's Republic of 
Korea (North Korea) 25% 20% 20% 80% 80% 
Mongolia 25% 20% 20% 80% 80% 
Sao Tome and Principe 25% 20% 20% 80% 80% 
Czech Republic 19% 15% 15% 79% 79% 
Republic of Namibia 33% 25% 25% 76% 76% 
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 Corporate Withholding tax rate Withholding tax rate  
Country Tax   as % of  
 rate   corporate tax rate 
  Technical Management   
    Technical Management 
      
St Lucia 33.33% 25% 25% 75% 75% 
Chile 20% 15% 15% 75% 75% 
Cook Islands 20% 15% 15% 75% 75% 
Croatia 20% 15% 15% 75% 75% 
Thailand 20% 15% 15% 75% 75% 
Brazil 34% 15% 25% 44% 74% 
Burkina Faso 27.5% 20% 20% 73% 73% 
Canada 28% 20% 20% 71% 71% 
Cambodia 20% 14% 14% 70% 70% 
Qatar 10% 5% 7% 50% 70% 
American Samoa 44% 30% 30% 68% 68% 
Botswana 22% 15% 15% 68% 68% 
Albania 15% 10% 10% 67% 67% 
Chad 30% 25% 20% 83% 67% 
El Salvador 30% 20% 20% 67% 67% 
Kenya 30% 20% 20% 67% 67% 
Latvia 15% 10% 10% 67% 67% 
Maldives 15% 10% 10% 67% 67% 
Senegal 30% 20% 20% 67% 67% 
Mozambique 32% 20% 20% 63% 63% 
St Vincent and the Grenadines 32.5% 20% 20% 62% 62% 
Republic of Congo 33% 20% 20% 61% 61% 
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 Corporate Withholding tax rate Withholding tax rate  
Country Tax   as % of  
 rate   corporate tax rate 
  Technical Management   
    Technical Management 
      
Barbados 25% 15% 15% 60% 60% 
Ghana 25% 15% 15% 60% 60% 
Liberia 25% 15% 15% 60% 60% 
Moldova 20% 12% 12% 60% 60% 
Nepal 25% 15% 15% 60% 60% 
Tajikistan 25% 15% 15% 60% 60% 
Tonga 25% 15% 15% 60% 60% 
Trinidad and Tobago 25% 15% 15% 60% 60% 
Zimbabwe 25% 15% 15% 60% 60% 
Zambia 35% 20% 20% 57% 57% 
Papua New Guinea 30% 12% 17% 40% 57% 
Swaziland 27.5% 15% 15% 55% 55% 
Fiji 28% 15% 15% 54% 54% 
Guatemala 28% 15% 15% 54% 54% 
Republic of South Africa 28% 15% 15% 54% 54% 
Niger 30% 16% 16% 53% 53% 
Togo 29% 15% 15% 52% 52% 
Armenia 20% 10% 10% 50% 50% 
Azerbaijan 20% 10% 10% 50% 50% 
Bolivia 25% 12.5% 12.5% 50% 50% 
Burundi 30% 15% 15% 50% 50% 
Central Africa Republic 40% 20% 20% 50% 50% 
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 Corporate Withholding tax rate Withholding tax rate  
Country Tax   as % of  
 rate   corporate tax rate 
  Technical Management   
    Technical Management 
      
Commonwealth of Dominica 30% 15% 15% 50% 50% 
Gambia 30% 15% 15% 50% 50% 
Georgia 30% 10% 15% 33% 50% 
Guyana 40% 20% 20% 50% 50% 
Jordan 14% 7% 7% 50% 50% 
Lebanon 15% 7.5% 7.5% 50% 50% 
Madagascar 20% 10% 10% 50% 50% 
Malawi 30% 15% 15% 50% 50% 
Mali 30% 15% 15% 50% 50% 
Nicaragua 30% 15% 15% 50% 50% 
Palestinian Autonomous Areas 20% 10% 10% 50% 50% 
Panama 25% 12.5% 12.5% 50% 50% 
Rwanda 30% 15% 15% 50% 50% 
Seychelles 30% 15% 15% 50% 50% 
Tanzania 30% 15% 15% 50% 50% 
Tunisia 30% 15% 15% 50% 50% 
Uganda 30% 15% 15% 50% 50% 
Yemen 20% 10% 10% 50% 50% 
Uruguay 25% 12% 12% 48% 48% 
Estonia 21% 10% 10% 48% 48% 
Pakistan 34% 15% 15% 44% 44% 
Guinea 35% 15% 15% 43% 43% 
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 Corporate Withholding tax rate Withholding tax rate  
Country Tax   as % of  
 rate   corporate tax rate 
  Technical Management   
    Technical Management 
      
Democratic Republic of Congo 35% 14% 14% 40% 40% 
Benin 30% 12% 12% 40% 40% 
Colombia 25% 10% 10% 40% 40% 
Djibouti 25% 10% 10% 40% 40% 
Malaysia 25% 10% 10% 40% 40% 
Cameroon 38.5% 15% 15% 39% 39% 
Bangladesh 27.5% 10% 10% 36% 36% 
Ethiopia 30% 10% 10% 33% 33% 
Gabon 30% 10% 10% 33% 33% 
Morocco 30% 10% 10% 33% 33% 
Nigeria 30% 10% 10% 33% 33% 
St Kitts and Nevis 33% 10% 10% 30% 30% 
Kosovo 10% 3% 3% 30% 30% 
Eritrea 34% 10% 10% 29% 29% 
Comoros Islands 35% 10% 10% 29% 29% 
Equatorial Guinea 35% 10% 10% 29% 29% 
US Virgin Islands 35% 10% 10% 29% 29% 
Vietnam 25% 10% 5% 40% 20% 
Sri Lanka 28% 5% 5% 18% 18% 
Angola 35% 5.25% 5.25% 15% 15% 
Myanmar 25% 3.5% 3.5% 14% 14% 
Iran 25% 3% 3% 12% 12% 
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 Corporate Withholding tax rate Withholding tax rate  
Country Tax   as % of  
 rate   corporate tax rate 
  Technical Management   
    Technical Management 
      
Cuba 35% 4% 4% 11% 11% 
Syria 28% 3% 3% 11% 11% 
Bhutan 30% 3% 3% 10% 10% 
Japan 25.5% 20% 0% 78% 0% 








List of services typically included in a service agreement between group 
entities 
The services agreements typically provide as follows: 
Example 1: 
This Agreement provides for the provision of services, including, but not limited to, the 
following: 
 
1. Financial Consulting 
Consultancy and advice on financial practices and procedures including but not 
limited to the following: 
1.1. general accounting methods, cost accounting methods, preparing and 
monitoring periodic profitability analyses; budgeting and business planning 
methods and capital expenditure requirements and financial forecasts; 
1.2. insurance, risk management and credit insurance services, including the 
provision of credit status reports; 
1.3. best financial practices and procedures; 
1.4. best internal audit practices and procedures;  
1.5. tax compliance and planning matters; 
1.6. treasury matters; 
1.7. central purchasing and/or price negotiation; and 
1.8. identification of areas of diversification, growth and added value through 
product, market and other reviews. 
2. Improved Personnel Strategy 
Consultancy and advice on maintaining and improving the XYZ's workforce 
(executive and other personnel) including but not limited to the following: 
2.1. finding replacements and extra staff; 
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2.2. reallocation of responsibilities to enable employees to perform specified 
functions; 
2.3. international developments in industrial relations; 
2.4. evaluating salaries, incentives and fringe benefits; 
2.5. competitive industrial relations policies and practices; 
2.6. improving management organisation; 
2.7. securing pension advice; and 
2.8. reviewing organisation and reporting standards. 
3. Business Advisory Services 
Consultancy and advice in order to enable the XYZ to develop and protect its 
commercial interests, and to comply with the law, including but not limited to the 
following: 
3.1. negotiating and drafting agreements, e.g. financial, purchase and sales, 
commercial agreements in respect of intellectual property, and service 
agreements; 
3.2. advising on claims, disputes, litigation and governmental proceedings; 
3.3. locating and evaluating outside consultants and experts for legal, 
production and other specialist services; 
3.4. subscribing to bodies beneficial to the XYZ's business; 
3.5. compliance with health, safety and product quality standards; 
3.6. identifying and researching of new products; 
3.7. business strategy, marketing strategy, production efficiency and controls, 
customer relations cost controls and sales co-ordination. 
4. Corporate Affairs 
Consultancy and advice with a view to promoting the XYZ's business, including but 
not limited to the following: 
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4.1. representing the business, political and local interest of the XYZ in 
international, national and regional industry business coalitions and trade 
associations. 
4.2. overseeing media relations and corporate image campaigns. 
5. Marketing   
Consultancy and advice with a view to promoting XYZ's business, including but not 
limited to the following services: 
5.1. preparation of group  material for use by the XYZ to enhance product 
recognition and to promote greater awareness of overall product base 
within the group of companies; 
5.2. preparation of group material for performance monitoring including market 
intelligence and brand health; 
5.3. marketing programmes, packaging and channel marketing, pricing tactics; 
5.4. product positioning, presentation and identity, communication and price 
positioning and  
5.5. developing the XYZ business model, defining portfolio roles and priorities 
and import strategies.  
6. Technical consulting 
Consultancy and advice with a view to promoting the XYZ's business, including but 
not limited to the following services: 
6.1. capital cost benchmarking for capacity investments; 
6.2. technical standards for plant, equipment and operations, reviews of 
performance against technical standards; 
6.3. technical performance measurement systems; 
6.4. standards and support with the implementation of good business 
practices, including “world class manufacture”, BCP, modern plant 
maintenance techniques; 
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6.5. assist with the procurement of raw materials for the benefit of  XYZ’sof 
XYZ’s business.  
7. Computer Advisory Services and Data Processing 
7.1. Consultancy and advice on information technology including but not limited 
to the following: 
7.1.1. operating and supporting  of a suitable computer system to 
meet the XYZ's manufacturing and commercial needs; 
7.1.2. evaluating of data processing results;  
7.1.3. updating systems to meet the needs of the XYZ's business; 
7.1.4. enterprise architecture and design, application technology, 
security and enterprise programs, information technology 
research and development, project management, network 
design, procurement and implementation; and 
7.1.5. negotiating of contracts with major information technology 
vendors. 
7.2. Such other Computer Advisory Services and Data Processing as the 
parties may agree upon. 
8. Intellectual Property Services  
Intellectual property services provided o brand owning companies, where not covered 
by a separate trademark services agreement, including but not limited to the 
following: 
8.1. Pre-registration trademark activity, including availability of trademarks and 
clearances to use a specific mark; 
8.2. Registration process for trademarks; 
8.3. Maintenance and renewals of trademarks; 
8.4. Protection and enforcement of trademarks; 
8.5. Maintenance of intellectual property database; and 
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8.6. Intellectual Property reporting to brand owners. 




Services to be provided by the provider to the participants include: 
 
1. Legal, Insurance, Sustainability and Risk 
1.1. Drafting legal agreements 
1.2. Assisting in negotiations and claims 
1.3. Advice on insurance coverage 
1.4. Assisting in insurance premium allocation 
1.5. Advice on insurance excesses 
1.6. Consolidation of group insurance questionnaire for renewal 
1.7. Assisting in roll out of BCP and risk compliance methodology 
1.8. Assisting in updating risk register, ensuring compliance and follow up as 
well as monitoring actions to mitigate risk  
1.9. Ensuring regulatory compliance 
1.10. Secretarial services 
1.11. Training on new developments  
1.12. Attending global risk and sustainability meetings 
1.13. Preparing board resolutions 
2.  Human Resources (“HR”): 
2.1. Advising on global HR matters 
2.2. Advising and drafting global HR policy and procedure 
2.3. Providing wellness programme, where appropriate 
2.4. Study assistance when required 
2.5. EDP, LDP training  
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2.6. Individual Perception Monitor surveys 
2.7. Talent management 
2.8. Recruitment for senior positions 
2.9. Managing international farm weekends 
3.  Finance, IT, Strategy and Administration: 
3.1. Placing excess money on call where appropriate 
3.2. Providing funding and facilities 
3.3. Implementation of group tax processes, compliance and monitoring 
3.4. Providing tax opinions and recommendations 
3.5. Tax meetings and assistance 
3.6. Providing tax planning strategies 
3.7. Preparation and review of transfer pricing documentation 
3.8. Financial Planning  
3.9. Reviewing scenarios and plans/forecasts 
3.10. Assisting with bookkeeping and accounting 
3.11. Ad Hoc advice 
3.12. IT internal control audits 
3.13. Compliance with accounting standards 
3.14. Liaising with Group Internal Audit and Audit planning process 
3.15. Liaising with Group bankers and assisting with guarantees, letters of 
support for funding  
3.16. Assisting with the strategic planning process 
3.17. Performance measurement 
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3.18. Training 
3.19. Preparation of valuations when investments made or disinvestments 
3.20. Due diligence processes 
3.21. Providing Group management information 
3.22. Monitoring of internal controls 
3.23. Ad hoc investigations 
3.24. Video conferencing 
3.25. Information technology – networking 
3.26. IT assistance and call centre 
3.27. Network availability 
3.28. Retirement fund administration for expats 
3.29. Setting up MPC structure 
3.30. Group cash flow management 
3.31. Setting finance policy and procedure and implementation assistance 
3.32. Approval framework set up and maintenance 
3.33. Group Internal Audit fee administration 
3.34. Intercompany account administration 
3.35. Arranging group calendar  
3.36. Setting up Ethics Line, communication and awareness, distribution and 
management of reports 
3.37. Internal control matrix reporting 
3.38. Cross Company Review attendance, report writing and programme 
completion 
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3.39. Attending Board meetings 
3.40. Liaising with consultants 
4.  Marketing and Advertising 
4.1. Providing global marketing 
4.2. Assisting in group buying of advertising 
4.3. Global advertising 
4.4. Developing and assisting in global communication strategy 




1. Executive Management 
Including but not limited to: 
1.1. Group Executive Management 
1.2. Strategy 
1.3. Financing 
1.4. Public, Investor, Media and Analyst relations. 
2. Finance 
Including but not limited to: 
2.1. Financial and Management Accounting including consolidated monthly 
and annual reporting, budgeting and forecasting. 
2.2. Treasury Management 
2.3. Corporate Finance 
2.4. Internal Audit of XYZ to ensure compliance with Group policy and          
procedures 
2.5. Management and maintenance of accounting and related systems. 
3. Business and Finance Integration 
Including but not limited to: 
3.1. Integration projects relating to and benefiting all subsidiaries of the Group. 
4. Human Resources 
Including but not limited to: 
4.1. Employee policies and procedures 
4.2. Remuneration and incentives policy, procedures and administration 
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4.6. HR database management. 
4.7. Staff and Management counselling and disputes. 
5. Legal 
Including but not limited to: 
5.1. Mergers and Acquisitions. General advice and assistance on M&A           
activity undertaken that direct or indirectly benefit the existing         
Subsidiaries. 
5.2. Share, Debt or other capital issues and adjustments, and structured           
financing. 
5.3. Sales Contracts 
5.4. Employment Contracts 
5.5. Leases 
5.6. Stock Exchange filings and compliance. 
6. Information Technology 
Including but not limited to: 
6.1. Group and subsidiary network operations 
6.2. Group and subsidiary internal systems 
6.3. Group and subsidiary internal and external websites. 
7. Corporate Communications 
Including but not limited to: 
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7.1. Group and subsidiary corporate events and conferences 
7.2. Group and subsidiary press Releases 
7.3. Group and subsidiary internal and external websites 
7.4. Group and subsidiary corporate branding, trade and service marks etc. 
 
8. Public Relations 
Including but not limited to: 
8.1. Group and subsidiary corporate events and conferences 
8.2. Group and subsidiary press and other media relations 
9. Administration 
Including but not limited to: 
9.1. All other administrative and sundry services provided for the benefit of the 






Case law dealing with source of intra-group cross border services 
1. India 
1.1. Ashapura Minichem Limited v. ADIT 
1.1.1. Background 
The case of Ashapura Minichem Limited v. ADIT190 involved 
an Indian company which entered into an agreement with a 
Chinese company in terms of which the Chinese company 
would provide bauxite testing services in its laboratory located 
in China and to provide test reports which would be used by 
the Indian company to define process parameters.  The Indian 
company did not withhold any withholding tax on the 
payments made to the Chinese company as it was of the 
opinion that the services would only attract withholding tax in 
India has it been rendered in India. 
1.1.2. Judgment 
The Court held that the retrospective amendment to 
section 9(1)(vii) of the Income Tax Act made in terms of the 
Finance Act, 2010, meant that the decisions of two prominent 
cases, Ishikawajima Harima Heavy Industries Company Ltd v. 
DIT191 and Clifford Chance v DCIT192 were no longer good law 
and accordingly it is no longer necessary that in order to attract 
taxability in India that the services must also be rendered in 
India.  Utilization of the services in India is sufficient to warrant 
the taxability of the services in India.  The Court further held 
that the provision of article 12(6) of the treaty between India 
and China provides that the payment for the service fees 
determines the source of the services to be located in India 
                                               
 
190 Ashapura Minichem Limited v. ADIT, Income Tax Appeal No. 2508/Mum/2008 
191 Ishikawajima Harima Heavy Industries Company Ltd v. DIT, Income Tax Appeal No. 239 of 2011, High Court 
of Bombay, Mumbai 
192 Clifford Chance v DCIT, Cases Nos. 181 and 182 of 2002, Bombay High Court 
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irrespective of the location from which the service are 
rendered.193 194 
1.2. Linklaters LLP, UK v. ITO 
1.2.1. Background 
The case of Linklaters LLP, UK v. ITO195, the taxpayer 
rendered professional services to some of its clients who were 
either based in India or were themselves providing services to 
clients in India. During the course of rending such services, 
lawyers from the United Kingdom (“UK”) office were sent to 
India. The aggregate period of stay of such lawyers in India 
was more than 90 days.  The taxpayer rendered services to 
the clients both in India and also from outside India.  Invoices 
were issued in GBP, USD or HKD for the total services 
rendered, whether in India or outside India.  The taxpayer filed 
a tax return in India and claimed that the entire income from 
these clients, including the income arising from work done in 
India, was not chargeable to tax in India. The taxpayer argued 
that the services rendered fell within the ambit of article 15 of 
the tax treaty between the UK and India, which only applied to 
individuals and not to a firm. Further, the taxpayer claimed that 
it did not have a permanent establishment (‘PE”) in India and 
in the absence of a PE, its income from Indian clients was not 
taxable in India.  
                                               
 
193 Article 12 of the treaty between India and China deals with royalties and technical services.  The source rules 
applicable in article 12(6) is however adopted from the source rules applicable to passive income.  It is therefore 
doubtful whether these rules should be applied to active income as the rules applicable to active income differs 
significantly from that applicable to passive income.  The source rules for active income generally provide that 
active income is only taxable in the source state if the income is derived from activities undertaken in that state.  It 
is noted that the Court did not deal with this issue. 
194 IBFD, Summary of Ashapura Minichem Limited v. ADIT, Tax Treaty Case Law 
195 Linklaters LLP, UK v. ITO, Income Tax Appeal Nos 4896/Mum/03 and 5058/Mum/03 
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However, the Indian tax authorities took the view that as the 
taxpayer had furnished services in India for more than 90 
days, it had a PE under article 5(2)(k) of the treaty.196   
The entire amount of the invoices issued by the taxpayer was 
assessable in India. On appeal, the Commissioner of Income 
Tax (Appeals) (“CITA”) upheld the order of the tax authorities. 
The taxpayer then approached the ITAT for adjudication and 
ruling.  
1.2.2. Judgment 
The ITAT held that the taxpayer was liable to tax in India on 
the fees that it received for services rendered to Indian clients. 
While delivering the ruling, it made references to the following 
queries raised by the taxpayer:  
Applicability of the treaty  
The ITAT referred to various Indian and international judicial 
precedents and the Commentaries of the OECD Model and 
concluded that the taxpayer was eligible to the benefits of the 
treaty, as long as the entire profits of the taxpayer are taxed in 
the United Kingdom, whether in the hands of the partnership 
firm or in the hands of individual partners.  
Existence of Service PE  
The taxpayer argued that in order for a PE to arise under 
article 5(2) of the treaty, the basic condition of article 5(1) (i.e. 
existence of a fixed place of business) must first be satisfied. 
It further argued that article 5(2) merely provides an illustrative 
                                               
 
196 Article 5(2) of the treaty between the UK and India reads as follows: “The term "permanent establishment" shall 
include especially:  
...  
(k) the furnishing of services including managerial services, other than those taxable under Article 13 (Royalties 
and fees for technical services), within a Contracting State by an enterprise through employees or other personnel, 
but only if:  
(i) activities of that nature continue within that State for a period or periods aggregating more than 90 days within 
any twelve-month period;” 
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list which can only be applied if there is a fixed place of 
business. Its activities in India were sporadic or isolated. 
There was no continuity of its activities in India, the partners 
and staff members visited India only as and when required. 
Thus, there was no fixed place of business in India and hence 
no PE under article 5(1).  
The ITAT rejected this argument and in doing so, it placed 
reliance on the Commentaries on the UN Model Convention 
(2001), which has a slightly different PE provision. It held 
that while some of the items listed under article 5(2) were 
illustrative of article 5(1), the others, notably a PE due to 
building site or construction installation under article 5(2)(j) or 
a service PE under article 5(2)(k) were on a stand-alone basis, 
and they did not require a fixed place of business to exist for 
a PE to be created, provided the threshold time period 
prescribed was met. The ITAT held that since the taxpayer's 
partners and staff members were present in India for more 
than 90 days in a 12-month period, a service PE under article 
5(2)(k) was indeed created in India.  
The taxpayer further tried to differentiate between "furnishing" 
of services and "rendering" of services, and contended that 
since it rendered professional services it should not be 
regarded to be "furnishing" of services as required under the 
service PE provision. The ITAT, however, did not agree with 
this argument and held that the "rendering" of services 
satisfied the requirement of "furnishing" of services.  
Service PE's income  
The taxpayer relied on the PE's hypothetical independence for 
determination of the quantum of income of the PE as provided 
in Art. 7(2). Applying this independence and arm's length 
principle, the taxpayer argued that the profits attributable to a 
PE are not the actual profits of the PE but hypothetical profits 
which the PE was expected to make if the PE was wholly 
independent of the general enterprise of which it is a PE.  
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The ITAT disagreed with this interpretation of the arm's length 
principle and hypothetical independence of the PE. It held that 
the fictional independence does not reach beyond the 
transactions with entities other than the general enterprise of 
the taxpayer. Therefore, all the income earned by the PE are 
taxable and no adjustment was permissible.  
Attribution to PE and force of attraction rule  
The taxpayer relied on the law laid down by the Supreme 
Court in the case of Ishikawajima Harima Heavy Industries 
Ltd. and applied by the Bombay High Court in the case of 
Clifford Chance.  It argued that if the services were not 
rendered in India, then the income was not taxable in India. 
The ITAT rejected this argument in view of a retrospective 
amendment in tax law that changed the provision of the source 
rule of taxation. The amended law provides that the income of 
the non‐resident shall be deemed to accrue or arise in India 
under clause (v) or clause (vi) or clause (vii) of Sec. 9(1) of the 
Income Tax Act, 1961 (ITA), and shall be included in his total 
income, whether or not (i) the non‐resident has a residence or 
place of business or business connection in India; or (ii) the 
non‐resident has rendered services in India.  
As regards application of the treaty to attribution of income to 
the service PE in India and the application of "force of 
attraction" rule, the ITAT referred to the language of article 
7(1) of the treaty which deals with taxability of business profits 
and determination of such profits for attribution to a PE. Article 
7(1), second sentence, of the treaty provides that "the profits 
of the enterprise may be taxed in the other state but only so 
much of them as is directly or indirectly attributable to that 
permanent establishment". The ITAT held that indirect 
attribution to the PE incorporates the force of attraction 
principle.197 This means that any services rendered to its 
                                               
 
197 Subsequent to this decision, the Special Bench of the Tribunal dealing with another case, ADIT v. Clifford 
Chance, Income Tax Appeal No 2060-61/Mum/2008, Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Special Bench, Mumbai, held 
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clients in India by the taxpayer, even where they were not 
rendered by the PE, were to be regarded as indirectly 
attributable to the PE and thus taxable in India.198  
1.3. Clifford Chance v. ADIT 
The most recent case is that of Clifford Chance v. ADIT199 which was heard 
by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Special Bench, in Mumbai. 
1.3.1. Background 
In this case the taxpayer was also a law firm (partnership firm) 
and tax resident of the United Kingdom. During the relevant 
tax years, it had provided certain legal consultancy services to 
its clients for projects in India.  
The taxpayer did not have a branch office in India but, during 
the relevant tax years, its partners and employees had visited 
India for performing a part of the work.  
For the tax year 1998/99, the taxpayer had offered, as taxable 
in India, the income attributable to the work performed in India. 
For the subsequent tax years, however, the taxpayer claimed 
that no part of its income was taxable in India since its 
partners’ and employees’ presence in India during the relevant 
tax years did not exceed 90 days. The taxpayer’s claim was 
based on the applicability of Art. 15 (Independent personal 
services) of the treaty.  
In the course of a tax audit, however, the tax authorities 
concluded that: 
 article 15 of the treaty did not apply in the present case; 
                                               
 
that article 7(1) of the tax treaty between UK and India is materially different from article 7(1) of the UN Model. The 
treaty between the UK and India did not incorporate the force of attraction principle.  This means that the services 
rendered to clients in India not rendered in India should not be regarded as indirectly attributable to the PE in India 
and as such are not taxable in India. 
198 IBFD, Summary of Linklaters LLP, UK v. ITO, Tax Treaty Case Law 
199 Clifford Chance v. ADIT, Income Tax Appeal No 2060-61/Mum/2008, Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Special 
Bench, Mumbai 
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 at least during tax years 1998/99 and 1999/2000, the 
taxpayer’s partners and employees were present in India 
for periods exceeding 90 days;  
 the taxpayer had a permanent establishment (PE) in India 
under article 5(2)(k) of the treaty; and 
 the taxpayer’s entire income from the projects (i.e. even 
the income attributable to the work performed outside 
India) was taxable in India under article 7 (Business profits) 
of the treaty.  
In first appeal, the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) 
("the CIT(A)") held that for all the relevant tax years except the 
tax year 1998/99, since the taxpayer’s partners’ and 
employees’ presence in India did not exceed 90 days, the 
taxpayer did not have a fixed base in India. Therefore, the 
taxpayer’s income for these tax years was not taxable in India 
under Art. 15 of the treaty. Further, with respect to the tax year 
1998/99, the CIT(A) held that the taxpayer’s income 
attributable to work performed outside India was not taxable 
in India, provided the taxpayer was able to prove that it had 
performed certain work outside India.  
1.3.2. Judgment 
The ITAT held that the taxpayer's income attributable to the 
work performed outside India was exempt from tax in India 
under article 7(1) of the treaty.  
The ITAT reached this conclusion on the following basis: 
 The counsel for the tax authorities submitted before the 
ITAT that the income (i.e. even the income attributable to 
the work performed outside India) was taxable in India in 
view of an amendment in respect of Sec. 9 of the Income 
Tax Act, 1961 (“the Act”) with retrospective effect from 1 
June 1976. The ITAT, however, rejected that proposition. 
In the ITAT’s view, the amendment was not relevant in the 
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present case since it was related to clauses (v), (vi) and 
(vii) of Sec. 9(1) of the Act, whereas in the present case, 
clause (i) of Sec. 9(1) of the Act was the relevant provision.  
 The counsel for the taxpayer company submitted before 
the ITAT that Art. 7(2) and Art. 7(3) of the treaty defined 
the phrase "profits directly or indirectly attributable to the 
PE".  
 The ITAT opined that the income earned by the taxpayer 
through performance of activities outside India could not 
be treated as "profits directly attributable to the PE" in 
terms of article 7(2) and article 7(3) of the treaty. Further, 
the ITAT concurred with the counsel for the taxpayer 
company that the phrase "profits indirectly attributable to 
the PE" was specifically defined in article 7(3)200 of the 
treaty, which had limited scope.  
The ITAT explained that this provision could not be equated 
with "the force of attraction rule" contained in the UN Model 
Convention. It also advised that article 7(1) of the treaty was 
not comparable with article 7(1) of the UN Model Convention.  
In view of the above, the ITAT concluded that the taxpayer’s 
income from performance of activities outside India was not 
taxable in India in view of article 7(1) of the treaty between 
India and the UK.  
2. Tanzania 
The only case dealing with source in this context in Tanzania is Tullow Tanzania BV 
v Commissioner General, Tanzania Revenue Authority201   
                                               
 
200 Art. 7(3) of the treaty provided that “where a PE takes an active part in negotiating, concluding or fulfilling 
contracts entered into by the enterprise, then, notwithstanding that other parts of the enterprise have also 
participated in those transactions, that proportion of profits of the enterprise arising out of those contracts which 
the contribution of the PE to those transactions bears that of the enterprise as a whole shall be treated for the 
purposes of para (1) of this Article as being the profits indirectly attributable to that PE”.  
201 Tullow Tanzania BV – Appellant and Commissioner General, TRA – Respondent, Appeal No. 7 of 2013 between 
the United Republic of Tanzania in the Revenue Appeals Tribunal, Dar Es Salaam. 
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2.1. Background 
Tullow Tanzania BV (“Tullow”) is a company registered in Tanzania and 
carries out offshore oil and gas exploration activities. In carrying out these 
activities, Tullow sent raw seismic data to contractors in Ireland (a 
separate legal entity) for processing and production of seismic sections.  
The seismic sections are sent to South Africa to another separate legal 
entity for interpretation and the results are sent back to Tullow for 
execution of the drilling programme.  The Tanzania Revenue Authority 
(“the TRA”) carried out an audit and raised an assessment for withholding 
tax due on the payments made to the contractors in Ireland and South 
Africa. 
The Tanzania Income Tax Act provides that service fees are sourced in 
Tanzania if they are paid for services rendered in Tanzania. 
The TRA argued that the location of consumption of the services is critical 
and not the location of performance of the services, i.e. in this instance 
Ireland and South Africa.  
2.2. Judgment 
The Revenue Appeals Tribunal (“RAT”) found in favour of TRA that 
payments made to in respect of services are subject to withholding tax in 
Tanzania as the services were rendered to Tullow which is located in 
Tanzania. In reaching this conclusion, the RAT stated the following: 
“Withholding tax is a tax on income.  Section 6 defines chargeable income 
of a person for a year of income from employment, business or 
investment shall be. 
“6(1)(b) in the case of a non resident person, the person’s income from 
employment, business of Investment for the year of income, but only to 
the extent that the income has a source in the United Republic.” 
This section identifies income bases as employment, business and 
investment.  In the case of employment the income can be in the form of 
wages and salaries or professional fees;” in the event of business the 
income takes the form of profits while investment will ordinarily generate 
dividend or interest income. 
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With due respect to the Appellant Counsel for income tax purposes the 
income will have a source in Tanzania if its base is in Tanzania; that is to 
say, if employer and employment are in Tanzania; business operations 
are in Tanzania and investment asset generating that income is in 
Tanzania.  Once this is understood S69(i) is fairly straightforward: 
Under section 69 the following payments have a source in the United 
Republic (i) payments, including service fees, of a type not mentioned in 
paragraphs (g) or (h) or attributable to employment exercised, service 
fees, of a type not mentioned in paragraphs (g) or (h) or attributable to 
employment exercised, service rendered or forebearance from exercising 
employment or rendering service – (i) in the United Republic, regardless 
of the place or payment; …”. 
In other words what matters is the location of the income base and not 
where the cheque is written or payment transfer was made. Once this 
interpretation is understood S83(1)(b) is easy and straightforward since it 
is a taxing provision. 
Now section “83(1) provides a resident is a person who 
(c) pays a service fee … with a source in the United Republic to a non 
resident person shall withhold income tax from the payment at the rate 
provided in paragraph 4(c) of the first schedule.” (i.e. 15% of the value of 
the payment). 
After what we have stated here and above we find that in a nutshell the 
law is clear on this in that Tullow Tanzania BV was the provider of 
employment to the professionals involved om the work for which payment 
was made and to the extent that the fee was generated by employment 
service in Tanzania it is therefore subject to withholding tax.” 
The Court also found support for its view in the Indian case, Ashapura 
Minichem discussed above. 202 The decision has not been well-received 
                                               
 
202 The Indian tax authorities argued that the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Clifford Chance 
[2008] 318 ITR 237 Bom (“Clifford Chance decision”), was no longer relevant as the retrospective effect of an 
amendment to section 9(10(vii) of the Income Tax Act which was introduced in terms of the Finance Act, 2010, 
meant that this decision, amongst others were no longer good law.  The Court supported this contention when it 
issued its judgement in Ashapura Minichem Limited v. ADIT.  The Clifford Chance decision was overruled in the 
Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Special Bench, Mumbai decision which was delivered on 13 May 2013. It is 
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as it disregards the Tanzanian source rules – in fact, it did not deal with it 
at all – which require the services to be rendered in Tanzania by a non-
resident before the withholding tax can apply and the purpose of 
section 69 of the Tanzanian tax act which is to bring into the tax net non-
residents who come into the country to provide services, and earn income 
as a result, and who then leave the country without paying any income 
tax. The decision is under appeal and is expected to be heard sometime 
during 2014.  
2.3. Observations 
Neither the Tax Revenue Appeals Board (“TRAB”)203 nor the RAT dealt 
with one of the grounds of objection and in the appeal that the 
assessment of withholding tax on services performed by a South African 
entity contravenes the tax treaty between South Africa and Tanzania. 
Although nor specifically relevant to the case, it is interesting to note the 
following obiter comment made by the judge when the case was heard in 
the TRAB in 2012, i.e.: 
“There is yet another aspect of this case and we wish to point it out, 
though by passing.  With our poor nation facing the might of powerful 
economic interests that have the full backing of their equally formidable 
governments in the oil and gas industry in which we have to enter, despite 
our inexperience, of which we are not sure of victory there are clear 
indications that we shall deliberately and unnecessarily setting up a David 
and Goliath contest, of which we are not sure of victory if we in the legal 
profession generally and in the administration of justice in particular saw 
the danger coming but decided to do nothing.  It is in these challenging 
circumstances that our laws need to be interpreted so as to safeguard the 
interests of the nation and avoid leaving our nation at the mercy of the 
strong nations even where our natural resources allow us to put our 
country in the driver’s seat.  We think the law is capacious enough to 
                                               
 
therefore possible that a Court could reach a different decision than what was reached in Ashapura Minichem 
Limited, i.e. that the fees for the services rendered in China was not subject to withholding tax in India, it not being 
from a source in India. 
203 Tullow Tanzania BV – Appellant and Commissioner General  – Respondent, Income Tax Appeal Case No. 10 
of 2011, Tax Revenue Appeals Board, Lindi 
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enable us respond with nimble and purposefully provide appropriate legal 
interpretation and solutions to the emerging legal issues in the oil and gas 
industry.” 
While one has empathy with this situation, good law and court decisions 
should not be based on emotions but rather on the facts of each case and 
by applying the law in the context as it stands as such actions will only 
cause uncertainty for investors with the resultant alienation of those 
investors who will favour regimes where laws and court decisions are not 
based on emotion. 
A further concern with the judgement delivered in the case is that the 
Court did not address the issue raised by the taxpayer regarding the 
application of the double tax agreement in force between South Africa 
and Tanzania (“SA/Tanzania treaty”) (there is no treaty in force between 
Ireland and Tanzania) and that the withholding tax on services by 
Tanzania is in contravention of the SA/Tanzania treaty.  I understand that 
the South African tax authority has raised this with the TRA but no 
response has yet been forthcoming from the TRA. 
3. Brazil 
3.1. Inter Partner Assistance Prestadora de Serviҫos de Assistência 24 
Horas Ltda204(“Inter Partner”) 
3.1.1. Background 
Inter Partner Assistance Prestadora de Serviços de 
Assistência 24 Horas Ltda. (“Inter Partner”), was a resident of 
Brazil and hired companies resident in Argentina, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, Portugal and Spain for the provision of services 
with no transfer of technology.  
Inter Partner was requested by the tax authorities to withhold 
income tax on the payments for the services provided by those 
                                               
 
204 Inter Partner Assistance Prestadora de Serviҫos de Assistência 24 Horas Ltda. v. Federal Union (National 
Treasury), Case 0024461-74.2005.4.03.6100 
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foreign companies. This request was based on Ruling COSIT 
1/2000 which allows the tax authorities to apply the other 
income article of the Brazilian tax treaties in respect of 
payments for technical assistance or technical services with 
no transfer of technology. In that case, there is no relation to 
royalties so that no tax may be levied under article 12 of the 
tax treaties. Furthermore, due to the lack of a definition in tax 
treaties of the term “profits”, taxation of these payments as 
business profits would not be possible because under 
domestic law such payments are classified as “revenue” and 
not as “profit”. Through the application of the other income 
article, Brazil could retain its taxation rights because in most 
Brazilian tax treaties this treaty article permits the country in 
which the income arises (source state) to tax such income.  
Inter Partner argued that (i) although domestic legislation 
determines the taxation of such payments in Brazil, under the 
treaties with Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, 
Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Portugal and 
Spain such income is taxed exclusively in the residence state; 
(ii) tax treaties prevail over domestic legislation; (iii) Ruling 
COSIT 1/2000 is illegal and unconstitutional and (iv) even if 
the payments could not be directly defined as ‘profits’ under 
Brazilian law, they are considered to be a component of the 
business profits of the foreign companies and, therefore, are 
governed by the treaty provision on business profits.  
The tax authorities argued that (i) the interpretation of the 
relevant treaties indicates that service income falls within the 
scope of the other income provision of the relevant treaties 
and, therefore, is subject to provisions of Ruling COSIT 
1/2000 and (ii) there is no hierarchy between tax treaties and 
domestic law.  
The lower Federal Court accepted all arguments brought by 
Inter Partner in its request. The tax authorities then appealed 
to the Federal Regional Court.  
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3.1.2. Legal background (treaty law)  
Although the argument used by the tax authorities was based 
on the other income article, this provision does not actually 
exist in the case of the Brazil-France treaty. The other income 
provision in the relevant treaties permits the source state to 
tax the income. 
3.1.3. Judgment 
The Federal Regional Court decided that the service fees paid 
to the foreign companies are not subject to withholding tax in 
Brazil.  
The Federal Regional Court held that Ruling COSIT 1/2000, 
as an administrative act, is not able to create a new taxable 
event or a new tax. In addition, this act only refers to technical 
services, which was not the type of service provided by the 
foreign companies.  
The Federal Regional Court also held that, although there is 
no hierarchy between tax treaties and domestic legislation, the 
domestic law that allows withholding tax on service fees paid 
to non-resident persons did not revoke the tax treaties signed 
by Brazil. The Court explained that although a posterior law is 
able to revoke a previous one (lex posterior derogate priori), 
the principle of lex specialis derogate generalis determines 
that a special law prevails over a general posterior law. Tax 
treaties are considered to be a special law under Brazilian 
legislation and, therefore, are not revoked by the general 
posterior law that allows withholding tax on the outbound 
payment of service fees.  
The Federal Regional Court also observed that the word 
“profits” in tax treaties refers technically to the concept that, 
under domestic legislation, is equivalent to “revenue”. The 
Court further explained that what is intended to be excluded 
from taxation at source in tax treaties is not only the profit, but 
the whole income remitted to the non-resident person. This 
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because there would never be a remittance of profits to the 
foreign service provider, since such profits are only calculated 
by the foreign company at a second moment, through the 
deduction of costs and expenses in accordance with the 
legislation of its state of residence.  
3.2. Copesul – CIA/Petroquimica do Sul v. Federal Union (National 
Treasury)205 
3.2.1. Background 
The plaintiff, Copesul – CIA / Petroquímica do Sul (“Copesul”), 
was a resident of Brazil. For the provision of technical services 
on its machines and equipment it had hired the Canadian 
company Surface Engineering Products and the German 
company Siemens Power Generation. During these activities 
no technical know-how was made available or transferred to 
the plaintiff.  
Copesul was requested by the tax authorities to withhold 
income tax on the payments for these services. This request 
was based on the Ruling COSIT 1/2000 which allows the tax 
authorities to apply the other income article of the Brazilian tax 
treaties in respect of payments for technical assistance or 
technical services, if no technology is transferred during these 
activities. In that case there is no relation with royalties so that 
no tax can be levied under article 12 of the treaties. 
Furthermore, due to the lack of a definition in tax treaties of 
the term ‘profits’, taxation of these payments as business 
profits is not possible either because under domestic law such 
payments are classified as ‘revenue’ and not as ‘profit’. 
Through the application of the other income article Brazil could 
retain its taxation rights because in most Brazilian tax treaties 
this treaty article permits the country in which the income 
arises (source state) to tax such income.  
                                               
 
205 Copesul – CIA/Petroquimica do Sul v. Federal Union (National Treasury), Case RE 1.161.467 – RS  
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Copesul argued that the Normative Ruling COSIT 1/2000 was 
not applicable because of the fact that the payments for 
technical services without the transfer of technology are 
governed by the treaty provisions on business profits, i.e. in 
the present case article 7 of the treaties with Canada and 
Germany.  
The lower Federal Court rejected Copesul’s appeal and 
Copesul then appealed to the Federal Regional Court. 
3.2.2. Legal background (treaty law)  
3.2.2.1. Article 21 of the Brazil-Canada tax treaty 
permits the source state to tax other income. 
Under article 22(2) [Elimination] of this treaty 
Canada grants a credit for the tax levied in 
Brazil on other income. Article 21 reads as 
follows:  
“Items of income of a resident of a Contracting 
State, arising in the other Contracting State and 
not dealt with in the foregoing Articles of this 
Convention, may be taxed in that other State.”  
3.2.2.2. Article 22 of the Brazil-Germany tax treaty 
permits both states to levy tax on other income, 
but under Art. 24 [Elimination] of this treaty 
Germany does not grant relief for the tax levied 
in Brazil. Art. 22 of this treaty reads as follows:  
“Items of income of a resident of a Contracting 
State which are not expressly mentioned in the 
foregoing Articles of this Agreement, may be 





3.2.3. Court decision 
3.2.3.1. Federal Regional Court of the 4th Region  
The Federal Regional Court held (not 
unanimously) in its decision of 4 July 2007 that 
the levying of withholding tax on the payments 
for technical services without the transfer of 
technology violates the provisions of article 7 of 
the treaties with Canada and Germany. The 
Court observed that although the payments 
could not be directly defined as “profits” under 
Brazilian law, they were considered by the 
Canadian and German companies as a 
component of their business profits. 
Consequently, as these services were not 
performed through a permanent establishment 
in Brazil, no taxation would be allowed in Brazil 
under article 7 of the pertinent treaties.  
The Federal Regional Court then observed that 
the tax authorities’ interpretation of the term 
“profits” would make the provisions of article 7 
of tax treaties never applicable. No payment of 
any remuneration abroad would be ever 
classified as "profit" under the Brazilian 
legislation and, therefore, taxable under article 
7 because the tax adjustments (additions, 
deductions, etc.) required by domestic 
legislation for the classification of the income as 
"profit" are only made by the non-resident 
companies at a second moment, at the end of 
their assessment period.  
Because this decision was not unanimous, the 
tax authorities appealed to the same Federal 
Regional Court.  
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The Federal Regional Court confirmed its 
earlier decision of 4 July 2007 in its decision of 
4 June 2009, No. 2002.71.00.006530-5/RS. 
The court reiterated that the levying of 
withholding tax on the payments for technical 
services without the transfer of technology 
would violate the provision of article. 7 of the 
treaties with Canada and Germany. The Court 
re-affirmed all arguments presented in the 
previous decision and reiterated that the 
Normative Ruling COSIT 1/2000 is not 
applicable in this case.  
3.2.3.2. Superior Court of Justice  
In a unanimous decision, the Superior Court of 
Justice confirmed the Federal Regional Court 
decision and held that the pertinent fees for the 
technical services are encompassed by article 7 
of the Brazilian treaties with Germany and 
Canada, according to which business profits of 
a company are taxable only in its residence 
state, unless a permanent establishment of 
such legal entity exists in the other contracting 
state. Based on this provision, the Court took 
the view that the payments made by Copesul in 
favour of the companies domiciled in Canada 
and Germany were business profits of these 
companies, which are subject to taxation only in 
the state of residence. Therefore, Brazil would 
not have taxing rights over such income.  
The Superior Court of Justice also observed 
that the treaty term "business profits" is not 
limited to the domestic meaning of "real profit" 
(lucro real) - which reflects the difference 
between gross receipts from business 
transactions and deductible business 
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expenses, subject to any adjustments under 
Brazilian tax legislation (net profit) - otherwise 
receipts from business transactions would 
never be covered by article 7 as such receipts 
are always subject to adjustments later in the 
assessment process. According to the Court, 
the treaty term "business profits" should be 
interpreted rather as "operational profit" (lucro 
operacional), which is defined under domestic 
law as the remuneration received in respect of 
the activities performed, including the income 
paid as compensation for the provision of 
services.  
The Superior Court of Justice also added that, 
although there is in Brazil no hierarchy between 
tax treaties and domestic law, a domestic law 
that contradicts tax treaties signed by Brazil, is 
not applicable due to the principle lex specialis 
derogate generalis. Tax treaties are considered 
to be special law under Brazilian legislation and, 
therefore, prevail over a general posterior 





Conflicting Situation:  Convention between the Republic of South Africa and 
the Republic of Mozambique for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the 
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income 
The Convention between the Republic of South Africa and the Republic of Mozambique for 
the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes 
on Income (“the Treaty”) came into force on 19 February 2009.  Both an English version and 
a Portuguese version of the Treaty was signed and it was assumed that both versions contain 
the same provisions. 
However, it has subsequently transpired that there are significant differences between the 
English version of article 5, which deals with Permanent Establishment and the Portuguese 
version thereof, in particular with respect to the furnishing of services. In terms of the English 
version of the Treaty, which is followed and accepted by South Africa as the correct version, 
a permanent establishment related to the furnishing of services will only be created “where 
activities of that nature continue (for the same or a connected project) within the Contracting 
State for a period or periods exceeding in the aggregate 180 days in any twelve-month period 
commencing or ending in the fiscal year concerned”.  This is however not the case in the 
Portuguese version of the Treaty, which is the version accepted by Mozambique.  My 
understanding is that the Portuguese version of article 5 creates a permanent establishment 
for a non-Mozambican enterprise if that enterprise provides services to a related party/group 
entity resident in Mozambique.  Therefore, based on the English version of the Treaty the 
mere provision of intra-group cross border services without being physically present in 
Mozambique for more than 180 days in aggregate does not create a permanent establishment 
for the South African resident in Mozambique (or vice versa), whereas a permanent 
establishment is created, notwithstanding any physical presence in Mozambique (or vice 
versa) in terms of the Portuguese version of the Treaty.   
This situation is creating major issues for South African companies with subsidiary operations 
in Mozambique. The tax issues are as follows: 
 The South African group services provider is regarded as a tax resident for 
Mozambican tax purposes and is subject to corporate tax on the service fees earned, 
after deducting the costs related to the provision of the service – first level of tax. 
 The South African entity is also subject to South African income tax on the service 
fees, after taking into account the costs related to the provision of the service.  
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However, as South Africa regards the income to be from a South African source and 
not a Mozambican source (i.e. foreign source), the South African entity is not entitled 
to a foreign tax credit for the Mozambican corporate tax paid – second level of tax.  
This therefore results in a double tax situation. 
 Further, should the Mozambican subsidiary wish to remit the funds for the services to 
South Africa, the fact that the fees have already been subject to Mozambican corporate 
tax is ignored and the Mozambican authorities will not allow the funds to be remitted 
before withholding tax on services are also paid – a third level of tax levied on the same 
amount. 
For example, say a South African entity provided services to its Mozambican subsidiary for an 
amount of ZAR10 000.  The service was provided from a location in South Africa.  The costs 
associated with the provision of the service was ZAR7 500. 
The after-tax effect of the situation described above is: 
Description South Africa (tax 
rate = 28%) 
Mozambique (tax 
rate + 32%) 
Service fee earned 10 000 10 000 
Less Allowable costs 7 500 7 500 
Taxable income 2 500 2 500 
Less Tax due 700 800 
Less Tax credit 0 0 
Net amount after tax 1 800 1 700 
 
The total corporate tax paid is therefore ZAR1 500 (ZAR700 + ZAR800). 
Withholding tax on services is payable on the gross amount at a rate of 20%, i.e. the 
withholding tax payable is ZAR2 000. 
Total tax paid will therefore be equal to ZAR3 500 (ZAR1 500 + ZAR2 000) in these 
circumstances.  The net position of the South African entity will be an overall loss of 
ZAR1 000 (ZAR10 000 – ZAR7 500 – ZAR700 – ZAR800 – ZAR2 0000). 







































Brazil – fixed margin information 
 
The following fixed margins apply in respect of various categories of intra-group cross border 
services, regardless of whether a productive process is performed in Brazil or not: 
1. Forty per cent (40%), for the products of: 
1.1. Pharmaceutical products; 
1.2. Tobacco products; 
1.3. Optical, photographic and cinematographic equipment and instruments; 
1.4. Machines, devices and equipment for dental-medical-hospital use; 
1.5. Extraction of oil and natural gas; and 
1.6. Oil derived products; 
2. Thirty per cent (30%, for the products of: 
2.1. Chemical products; 
2.2. Glass and glass products; 
2.3. Cellulose, paper and paper products; and 
2.4. Metallurgy; and 





                                               
 
206 Dias Musa, S. and Lagrasta, C., Brazil - Transfer Pricing, Topical Analyses IBFD,  accessed on 30 April 2014 
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World map – Transfer pricing and general arm’s length provision countries Annexure 7(4) 
 
 
Note – the world map is a visual representation only and should not be used for interpretative purposes. 
Dark blue – transfer pricing provisions apply 
Light blue – no transfer pricing provisions but transfer pricing principles apply 




Countries with Transfer Pricing Documentation Guidelines  
The following countries had transfer pricing documentation guidelines applicable to intra-group 
cross border fees as at 2011:207 
Argentina Australia Austria 
Belgium Brazil Canada 
Chile China Colombia 
Czech Republic Denmark Ecuador 
Egypt Finland France 
Germany Greece Hong Kong 
Hungary India Indonesia 
Ireland Israel Italy 
Japan Kazakhstan Republic of Korea 
Lithuania Luxembourg Malaysia 
Mexico Moldova Netherlands 
New Zealand Norway The Sultanate of Oman 
Pakistan Peru Philippines 
Poland Portugal Romania 
Russia Singapore Slovak Republic 
Slovenia Republic of South Africa Spain 
Sri Lanka Sweden Switzerland 
Thailand Turkey United Kingdom 
United States of America Uruguay Venezuela 
Vietnam   
 
 
                                               
 








Limitations on deductions 
Examples of countries or regions which limit deductions related to intra-group cross border 
technical and/or management and service charges are noted below. A more detailed list is 
also attached to this annexure.208 
1. Turkey 
Turkey will only allow the deduction of intra-group service fees if it satisfies certain 
prescribed conditions. The prescribed conditions are that the service must in fact be 
rendered, the intra-group charge for such services must be in accordance with the 
arm’s length principle and the recipient company must need the service.  Intra-group 
service fees which do not meet these prescribed conditions will be challenged in 
terms of the transfer pricing rules209 and may be regarded as deemed profits which 
are non-deductible expenditure for income tax purposes.210 
2. Republic of Korea 
Intra-group service fees, amongst others, are only deductible if the following 
conditions are met: 
 Presence of an advance agreement for provision of services together with 
proof of services actually rendered; 
 Proof that the recipient benefited in the form of revenue increase or cost 
reduction; and 
 In the case of the cost plus method or the transactional net margin method 
(“TNMM”) method, costs used for the calculation included all direct and 
indirect costs incurred, except in the case of outsourced services where only 
direct costs may be used. 
                                               
 
208 The list is prepared based in information obtained from various sources, i.e. the IBFD, Deloitte, Ernst & Young, 
KPMG and pwc where specific reference was made to the deductibility of intra-group cross border fees.  The list 
serves merely as an example of countries or regions where deductions may be limited.  A comprehensive study to 
determine whether specific rules exist which deal with the deductibility of these expenses on a country-by-country 
basis was not performed as such an exercise is beyond the scope of this paper. 
209 Turkey introduced formal transfer pricing rules under Article 13 of the Corporate Income Tax Law.  The rules 
became effective from 1 January 2007. 




Mexican Income Tax Law does not allow resident taxpayers to deduct expenditures 
paid abroad to non-resident suppliers if the costs are determined using indirect-
charge method arrangements, regardless of its arm’s-length nature. 
4. Spain  
The deductibility of intra-group services in Spain was considered in a Supreme Court 
judgement.211  The Spanish Tax Authority (“the STA”) denied the deduction of intra-
group service fees which related to general administration, accounting systems, and 
legal and financial services.  The deduction was denied as the STA was of the opinion 
that the Spanish entity neither received the services, i.e. the services were not 
rendered nor required the services, i.e. it was not necessary to provide the services 
to the Spanish entity as the Spanish entity had the appropriate structure in place to 
carry out the services. 
5. Ghana 
The Ghanaian Tax Authority applies a general anti-avoidance rule contained in its 
current tax legislation in terms of which intra-group transactions are valued by 
reference to industry practice.  Transactions are re-characterised if the transaction is 
deemed to be entered into as part of a tax-avoidance scheme and if the legal form of 
the transaction is not in line with the economic substance thereof.  In addition, specific 
actions are also provided for in terms of the Technology Transfer Regulations 
(“TTR”).212 The TTR limit the amount of royalties and management and technical fees, 
amongst others, that can be paid to related parties outside of Ghana’s jurisdiction. 
Payments are regarded as unacceptable if the cost it duplicated and the service 
performed is readily available in Ghana, the management agreements are not 
registered with the Ghana Investment Promotion Centre, which administers the TTR 
or if the management agreements are registered, the limitations on transferable 
amounts are exceeded (this usually results in the denial of a deduction of the total 
amount and not only of the excess transferred). 
                                               
 
211 STS 3054/2013 
212 The Technology Transfer Regulations came into force in 1992. 
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6. South America 
Most countries in the region will only allow a deduction for intra-group services if the 
following conditions are met: 
 Services have actually been rendered; 
 Services are related to the activity performed by the company and necessary 
to generate taxable income in the country; 
 The charges must be proportional to the activity performed by the subsidiary, 
i.e. the amount must be reasonable in relation to the income or profit 
generated; 
 In some instances both the service fee and the withholding tax must have 
been paid before it can be deducted (Argentina) 
Whilst these requirement are similar to those noted in the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guideline, the actual gathering of the information to prove compliance with 
deductibility requirements can pose a number of challenges for taxpayers located in 
these countries.  Examples of evidentiary requirements include flight tickets, 
correspondence and reports by headquarter experts which demonstrate that services 
were provided as well as clear examples of how the services generated profits for the 
taxpayer.  As the assistance provided is in many cases of a fragmentary nature, for 
example a multiparty conference call with an expert in the legal department or a four-
hour assistance from engineers located at the headquarters when selecting a new 
supplier, generating a file that extensively documents the benefits and relevance of 
the services rendered from aboard may be extremely difficult and burdensome on the 
taxpayer, especially as such evidence is often widely dispersed across the 
organisation and even across various jurisdictions.  
Another issue, in particular in countries which require payment for the services before 
it can be claimed as a deduction, relates to restrictions to currency outflows which 







Sorted from highest effective rate to lowest based on taxes on technical service fees 
 
      
 Withholding tax rates  Overall effective 
   Corporate tax rate 
Jurisdiction   Tax   
   Rate   
 Technical Management  Technical Management 
      
Argentina 35% 35% 35% 70% 70% 
France 33.3% 33.3% 33.3% 66.6% 66.6% 
Chad 25% 20% 40% 65% 60% 
United States 
of America 30% 30% 35% 65% 65% 
Guyana 20% 20% 40% 60% 60% 
St Lucia 25% 25% 33.33% 58.33% 58.33% 
Costa Rica 25% 25% 30% 55% 55% 
India 25% 25% 30% 55% 55% 
Mexico 25% N/A 30% 55%   
Spain 24.75% 24.75% 30% 55% 55% 
Republic of 
Congo 20% 20% 33% 53% 53% 
Mozambique 20% 20% 32% 52% 52% 
Venezuela 17% 17% 34% 51% 51% 
Belize 25% 25% 25% 50% 50% 
El Salvador 20% 20% 30% 50% 50% 
Summary of effective tax rate for jurisdictions which levy withholding tax on technical fees 
as well as disallow the expenditure incurred in certain circumstances 
 
Assumptions to determine overall effective rate: 
 
All the expenditure did not meet deduction criteria 
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 Withholding tax rates  Overall effective 
   Corporate tax rate 
Jurisdiction   Tax   
   Rate   
 Technical Management  Technical Management 
      
Senegal 20% 20% 30% 50% 50% 




14% 14% 35% 49% 49% 
Canada 20% 20% 28% 48% 48% 
Portugal 25% 25% 23% 48% 48% 
Japan 20% N/A 25.5% 45.5%   




20% 20% 25% 45% 45% 
Egypt 20% N/A 25% 45%   
Indonesia 20% 20% 25% 45% 45% 
Ivory Coast 20% 20% 25% 45% 45% 
Sao Tome and 
Principe 20% 20% 25% 45% 45% 
Burundi 15% 15% 30% 45% 45% 
Commonwealth 
of Dominica 15% 15% 30% 45% 45% 
Equatorial 
Guinea 10% 10% 35% 45% 45% 
Nicaragua 15% 15% 30% 45% 45% 
Peru 15% 30% 30% 45% 60% 
Fiji 15% 15% 28% 43% 43% 
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 Withholding tax rates  Overall effective 
   Corporate tax rate 
Jurisdiction   Tax   
   Rate   
 Technical Management  Technical Management 
      
Guatemala 15% 15% 28% 43% 43% 
St Kitts and 
Nevis 10% 10% 33% 43% 43% 
Swaziland 15% 15% 27.5% 42.5% 42.5% 
Benin 12% 12% 30% 42% 42% 
Ghana 15% 15% 25% 40% 40% 
Republic of 
Serbia 25% 25% 15% 40% 40% 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 15% 15% 25% 40% 40% 
Turkey 20% 20% 20% 40% 40% 
Zimbabwe 15% 15% 25% 40% 40% 
Botswana 15% 15% 22% 37% 37% 
Uruguay 12% 12% 25% 37% 37% 
Chile 15% 15% 20% 35% 35% 
Colombia 10% 10% 25% 35% 35% 
Malaysia 10% 10% 25% 35% 35% 
Thailand 15% 15% 20% 35% 35% 
Singapore 17% 17% 17% 34% 34% 
Ukraine 15% 15% 18% 33% 33% 
Estonia 10% 10% 21% 31% 31% 
Madagascar 10% 10% 20% 30% 30% 
Kuwait 15% 15% 15% 30% 30% 
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 Withholding tax rates  Overall effective 
   Corporate tax rate 
Jurisdiction   Tax   
   Rate   
 Technical Management  Technical Management 
      
Myanmar 3.5% 3.5% 25% 28.5% 28.5% 
Latvia 10% 10% 15% 25% 25% 
Paraguay 15% 15% 10% 25% 25% 
Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia 5% 20% 20% 25% 40% 
Moldova 12% 12% 12% 24% 24% 
Lebanon 7.5% 7.5% 15% 22.5% 22.5% 
The Sultanate 
of Oman 10% 10% 12% 22% 22% 
Albania 10% 10% 10% 20% 20% 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 10% 10% 10% 20% 20% 
Timor-Leste 10% 10% 10% 20% 20% 






 Sorted from highest effective rate to lowest based on taxes on management fees 
      
 Withholding tax rates  Overall effective 
   Corporate tax rate 
Jurisdiction   Tax   
   Rate   
 Technical Management  Technical Management 
      
Argentina 35% 35% 35% 70% 70% 
France 33.3% 33.3% 33.3% 66.6% 66.6% 
United States 
of America 30% 30% 35% 65% 65% 
Chad 25% 20% 40% 65% 60% 
Guyana 20% 20% 40% 60% 60% 
Peru 15% 30% 30% 45% 60% 
Brazil 15% 25% 34% 49% 59% 
St Lucia 25% 25% 33.33% 58.33% 58.33% 
Costa Rica 25% 25% 30% 55% 55% 
India 25% 25% 30% 55% 55% 
Spain 24.75% 24.75% 30% 54.75% 54.75% 
Republic of 
Congo 20% 20% 33% 53% 53% 
Mozambique 20% 20% 32% 52% 52% 
Venezuela 17% 17% 34% 51% 51% 
Belize 25% 25% 25% 50% 50% 
Summary of effective tax rate for jurisdictions which levy withholding tax on technical fees 
as well as disallow the expenditure incurred in certain circumstances 
 
Assumptions to determine overall effective rate: 
 
All the expenditure did not meet deduction criteria 
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 Withholding tax rates  Overall effective 
   Corporate tax rate 
Jurisdiction   Tax   
   Rate   
 Technical Management  Technical Management 
      
El Salvador 20% 20% 30% 50% 50% 




14% 14% 35% 49% 49% 
Canada 20% 20% 28% 48% 48% 
Portugal 25% 25% 23% 48% 48% 




20% 20% 25% 45% 45% 
Indonesia 20% 20% 25% 45% 45% 
Ivory Coast 20% 20% 25% 45% 45% 
Sao Tome and 
Principe 20% 20% 25% 45% 45% 
Burundi 15% 15% 30% 45% 45% 
Commonwealth 
of Dominica 15% 15% 30% 45% 45% 
Equatorial 
Guinea 10% 10% 35% 45% 45% 
Nicaragua 15% 15% 30% 45% 45% 
Fiji 15% 15% 28% 43% 43% 
Guatemala 15% 15% 28% 43% 43% 
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 Withholding tax rates  Overall effective 
   Corporate tax rate 
Jurisdiction   Tax   
   Rate   
 Technical Management  Technical Management 
      
St Kitts and 
Nevis 10% 10% 33% 43% 43% 
Swaziland 15% 15% 27.5% 42.5% 42.5% 
Benin 12% 12% 30% 42% 42% 
Ghana 15% 15% 25% 40% 40% 
Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia 5% 20% 20% 25% 40% 
Republic of 
Serbia 25% 25% 15% 40% 40% 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 15% 15% 25% 40% 40% 
Turkey 20% 20% 20% 40% 40% 
Zimbabwe 15% 15% 25% 40% 40% 
Botswana 15% 15% 22% 37% 37% 
Uruguay 12% 12% 25% 37% 37% 
Chile 15% 15% 20% 35% 35% 
Colombia 10% 10% 25% 35% 35% 
Malaysia 10% 10% 25% 35% 35% 
Thailand 15% 15% 20% 35% 35% 
Singapore 17% 17% 17% 34% 34% 
Ukraine 15% 15% 18% 33% 33% 
Estonia 10% 10% 21% 31% 31% 
Madagascar 10% 10% 20% 30% 30% 
Kuwait 15% 15% 15% 30% 30% 
 144 
      
 Withholding tax rates  Overall effective 
   Corporate tax rate 
Jurisdiction   Tax   
   Rate   
 Technical Management  Technical Management 
      
Myanmar 3.5% 3.5% 25% 28.5% 28.5% 
Latvia 10% 10% 15% 25% 25% 
Paraguay 15% 15% 10% 25% 25% 
Moldova 12% 12% 12% 24% 24% 
Lebanon 7.5% 7.5% 15% 22.5% 22.5% 
The Sultanate 
of Oman 10% 10% 12% 22% 22% 
Albania 10% 10% 10% 20% 20% 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 10% 10% 10% 20% 20% 
Timor-Leste 10% 10% 10% 20% 20% 







World map – Possible denial of deductions Annexure 9(6) 
 
Note – the world map is a visual representation only and should not be used for interpretative purposes. 
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World map – Withholding tax on technical fees and no deductions Annexure 9(7) 
 
Note – the world map is a visual representation only and should not be used for interpretative purposes. 
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World map – Withholding tax on management fees and no deductions Annexure 9(8) 
 
 
Note – the world map is a visual representation only and should not be used for interpretative purposes. 
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Annexure 10 
Gross-up practices to determine margins 
There are some MNEs which have adopted “gross-up” practices to determine the quantum of 
the service fees to be charged where withholding taxes are payable in respect of services and 
no deduction or rebate can be claimed for the withholding taxes levied.  The gross-up clause 
is often used to ensure that the non-resident group company obtains the necessary 
documentation from the tax authorities of the foreign jurisdiction within certain limited time 
frames in order to enable the domestic jurisdiction to claim a deduction or rebate of the 
withholding tax paid.  The gross-up clause becomes effective in respect of future payments to 
the resident group company.  Any limitations on the ability of the entity to claim a tax deduction 
or rebate is also passed on to the entity located in the foreign jurisdiction. 
The gross-up clauses inevitably result in an increased cost for the entity located in the 
jurisdiction which benefitted from the services with a resultant reduction in the income tax 
collected by that jurisdiction.  The withholding tax collected by that jurisdiction in respect of 
that transaction is however more than the reduction in the income tax collected. 
The gross-up calculations will depend on whether the MNEs aims to be in a neutral position 
overall or whether the entity which rendered the services needs to be in a neutral position.  
The grossed up amount, if the MNE aims to be in a neutral position from a group perspective, 
is less than the gross up amount if the company which rendered the services need to be in a 
neutral position.  The gross-up calculations may also be influenced by the presence or not of 
minority shareholders who may be compromised if a group view is adopted as opposed to an 
entity-specific view.   
The margin that needs to be added in the context of gross-up practices is significantly more 
than the margin ranges of between 3% and 10% applied by MNEs for non-specialist services.  
For example, in order to achieve that same net after tax position if the acceptable margin is 
5%, the gross-up margin needs to be at least 23.5% (assuming a withholding tax rate of 15% 
and a tax rate of 25%) if the group wishes to be neutral, and 31.3% if the company which 
rendered the services needs to be in a neutral position. 
The author understands that there are jurisdictions that do not accept the grossing up of 
margin to compensate for withholding tax on services.  The jurisdictions treat such services 
as excessive and usually denies a deduction of the expense in total. Specific details are 
however not available at present. 
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Annexure 11 




UK Co is the holding company of a large international group. It provides intra-group management services to a number of its operations.  The group policy requires that the cost-plus method be used 
to determine the relevant charge.  A margin of 5% is considered reasonable and added to the actual costs determined. Services are rendered to entities located in the Republic of Uzbekistan, 
Argentina and Gambia, amongst others.  The services are rendered from the head office located in the United Kingdom and is regarded as income from a domestic source for income tax purposes 
in the United Kingdom.  A tax credit is therefore not available but there is no prohibition on claiming any withholding tax levied on domestic income as an expense for tax purposes. The entity located 
in the country which benefitted from the services rendered allowed a deduction for the service fee levied. All other income received and expenditure incurred are ignored for purposes of the 
example. 
 
The tax consequences on a country-by-country basis are as follows: 
 
Description Uzbekistan Argentina Gambia United Kingdom Overall position 
Service fee income                   315 000               315 000  
Costs incurred to provide services                  -300 000              -300 000  
Intra-group service fees incurred             -105 000              -105 000              -105 000                -315 000  
Net profit/(loss) before taking into account withholding tax costs incurred             -105 000              -105 000              -105 000                 15 000              -300 000  
Corporate tax rate in recipient country 8% 35% 30%    
Reduction in corporate tax payable as deduction allowed                  8 400                 36 750                 31 500                  76 650  
Withholding tax on management services 20% 35% 15%    
Withholding tax payable               -21 000                -36 750                -15 750                -73 500                -73 500  
Net tax (collected)/foregone by country concerned               -12 600                        -                   15 750     
Net profit/(loss) after taking into account withholding tax costs incurred                    -58 500              -296 850  
Corporate tax rate in United Kingdom      22%   
Reduction in corporate tax payable if withholding tax allowed as a 
deduction in full                      12 870                 12 870  





SA Co is the holding company of a large international group. It provides intra-group management services to a number of its operations.  The group policy requires that the cost-plus method be used 
to determine the relevant charge.  A margin of 5% is considered reasonable and added to the actual costs determined. Services are rendered to entities located in the Republic of Uzbekistan, 
Argentina and Gambia, amongst others.  The services are rendered from the head office located in South Africa and is regarded as income from a domestic source for income tax purposes in South 
Africa.  A tax credit is therefore not available and there is limitation on claiming a deduction for any withholding tax levied on domestic income as an expense for tax purposes. The entity located in 
the country which benefitted from the services rendered allowed a deduction for the service fee levied. All other income received and expenditure incurred are ignored for purposes of the example. 
 
The tax consequences on a country-by-country basis are as follows: 
 
Description Uzbekistan Argentina Gambia South Africa Overall position 
Service fee income                   315 000               315 000  
Costs incurred to provide services                  -300 000              -300 000  
Intra-group service fees incurred             -105 000              -105 000              -105 000                -315 000  
Net profit/(loss) before taking into account withholding tax costs incurred             -105 000              -105 000              -105 000                 15 000              -300 000  
Corporate tax rate in recipient country 8% 35% 30%    
Reduction in corporate tax payable as deduction allowed                  8 400                 36 750                 31 500                  76 650  
Withholding tax on management services 20% 35% 15%    
Withholding tax payable               -21 000                -36 750                -15 750                -15 000               -73 500  
Net tax (collected)/foregone by country concerned               -12 600                        -                   15 750     
Net profit/(loss) after taking into account withholding tax costs incurred                    NIL             -296 850  
Corporate tax rate in United Kingdom      28%   
Reduction in corporate tax payable if withholding tax allowed as a 
deduction in full                      NIL                NIL 








Honduras Co is the holding company of a large international group. It provides intra-group management services to a number of its operations.  The group policy requires that the cost-plus method 
be used to determine the relevant charge.  A margin of 5% is considered reasonable and added to the actual costs determined. Services are rendered to entities located in the Republic of 
Uzbekistan, Argentina and Gambia, amongst others.  The services are rendered from the head office located in the Honduras and is regarded as income from a domestic source for income tax 
purposes in South Africa.  Neither a tax credit nor a deduction for any withholding tax paid is available. The entity located in the country which benefitted from the services rendered allowed a 
deduction for the service fee levied. All other income received and expenditure incurred are ignored for purposes of the example. 
 
The tax consequences on a country-by-country basis are as follows: 
 
Description Uzbekistan Argentina Gambia Honduras Overall position 
Service fee income                   315 000               315 000  
Costs incurred to provide services                  -300 000              -300 000  
Intra-group service fees incurred             -105 000              -105 000              -105 000                -315 000  
Net profit/(loss) before taking into account withholding tax costs incurred             -105 000              -105 000              -105 000                 15 000              -300 000  
Corporate tax rate in recipient country 8% 35% 30%    
Reduction in corporate tax payable as deduction allowed                  8 400                 36 750                 31 500                  76 650  
Withholding tax on management services 20% 35% 15%    
Withholding tax payable               -21 000                -36 750                -15 750                NIL               -73 500  
Net tax (collected)/foregone by country concerned               -12 600                        -                   15 750     
Net profit/(loss) after taking into account withholding tax costs incurred                    -58 500              -296 850  
Corporate tax rate in United Kingdom      25%   
Reduction in corporate tax payable if withholding tax allowed as a 
deduction in full                      -3 750                -3 750 
Net group loss position                   -300 600 
 
 153 
 
 154 
 
 155 
 
 156 
 
 157 
 
 158 
 
 159 
 
 160 
 
 161 
 
 162 
 
 163 
 
 164 
 
